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Abstract
The results of two studies provided support for the importance of being sensitive to 
situational nuances (i.e., discriminative facility), especially when interpreting others’ 
negative behaviors. Study I empirically clarified the distinction between 
discriminative facility and a seemingly related construct, self-monitoring.
Additionally, a new, more convenient measure of discriminative facility was 
constructed and validated. Study 2 established boundary conditions for the efficacy of 
discriminative facility. Consistent with past research (Chiu, Hong, Mischel, & Shoda, 
1995), discriminative facility was associated with positive social interaction quality. 
However, this finding was limited to the interpretation of negative (but not positive) 
behaviors. In addition, individuals high in discriminative facility demonstrated greater 
flexibility of social influence strategy use than individuals low in discriminative 
facility.
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Understanding and Managing Others:
The Impact of Discriminative Facility upon Social Influence
Overview
Over the years, investigators have considered the capacities believed integral to 
interpersonal insight under the rubric “social intelligence” (e.g., Burks, 1937; Chapin, 
1939; Hunt, 1928; Jones & Day, 1997; McClatchy, 1929; Thorndike, 1920; Wong,
Day, Maxwell, & Meara, 1995). Social intelligence is generally recognized as 
consisting of multiple components (e.g.. Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1989; O ’Sullivan & 
Guilford, 1975). In 1920, E. L. Thorndike articulated the first definition of social 
intelligence as “the ability to understand and manage men and women, boys and girls -  
to act wisely in human relations” (p. 228). These two components, understanding 
others and managing others, have been explored by a number of investigators (e.g.. 
Ford & Tisak, 1983; Hunt, 1928; Jones & Day, 1997; Keating, 1978; McClatchy,
1929; Riggio, Messamer, & Throckmorton, 1991; Strieker & Rock, 1990; Weinstein, 
1969).
In addition, a large body of literature has examined social influence, or 
compliance (i.e., techniques for eliciting desired behavior from others, e.g., Cody, 
Canary, & Smith, 1994; Cody & McLaughlin, 1980; Falbo, 1977; Miller, Boster, 
Roloff, & Seibold, 1977; Rule, Bisanz, & Kohn, 1985). Arguably, effective social 
influence involves the understanding and management of others.
Therefore, the present dissertation attempted to integrate the social intelligence 
and social influence literatures. Two experiments investigated a recognized component
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of social intelligence, discriminative facility (sensitivity to situational cues), and its 
impact on interpersonal compliance. The degree of overlap between a similar construct 
that also encompasses situational sensitivity, self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974), was 
examined. Additionally, how individual differences in discriminative facility 
influenced relationship satisfaction and the selection of social influence techniques 
was investigated.
One Important Component of Social Intelligence: Discriminative Facility (OF)
Following Thorndike’s introduction, several conceptualizations of social 
intelligence emerged that emphasized the importance of understanding the social 
situation. Situational knowledge is an integral part of social intelligence (Cantor & 
Kihlstrom, 1985). The ability to interpret ambiguous social situations correctly is 
thought to be a component of social intelligence (Jones & Day, 1997). Presumably, 
individuals that are more knowledgeable of situational prescripts will be better able to 
understand and manage others.
O f central interest for the present dissertation, Chiu et al. (1995) regarded 
sensitivity to situational cues, which they termed discriminative facility, as 
representative of social intelligence. Discriminative facility was defined as “the 
individual’s sensitivity to subtle cues about the psychological meaning of the 
situation’’ (Chiu et al., 1995, p. 49). Chiu et al. (1995) noted that researchers (e.g.. 
Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987, 1989; Mischel, 1973; Shoda, Mischel, & Wright, 1993) 
have linked discriminative facility to “adaptive social behavior.’’ To best predict 
behavior, recognition of the interaction between situational factors and individual
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factors is critical (Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Wright & Mischel, 1987). Thus, Mischel 
and his colleagues (Chiu et al., 1995; Mischel, 1973; Mischel & Shoda, 1998; Shoda, 
Mischel, & Wright, 1989; Wright & Mischel, 1987, 1988) have suggested that 
conditional encoding, the recognition of the relationship between certain if x 
(situational components) then y (behavioral responses), is a measure of discriminative 
facility and therefore a demonstrable component of social intelligence. Wright and 
Mischel (1987) proposed that recognizing the covariation between certain behaviors 
and situations should inform individuals’ impressions of others.
Consequently, a modified version of Thorndike’s definition would best 
represent contemporary thinking about social intelligence. In other words, social 
intelligence includes the recognition of the demands of the situation, understanding the 
individuals in the situation, and an appraisal of how best to act in the situation.
Understanding and Managing Others
As the previous examples illustrate, recognition of situational intricacies is 
essential to understanding individuals and their behavior. Chiu et al. (1995) presented 
discriminative facility as encompassing sensitivity to informative, subtle nuances 
present in social situations that have precipitated various events. Cantor and Kihlstrom 
(1989) proposed that socially intelligent behavior includes recognizing situations that 
maximize goal-attainment while minimizing costs (e.g., not meeting other goals, 
social disapproval). It is assumed that individuals use information gleaned from 
discriminative facility to form a more refined understanding of their social world.
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As mentioned previously, to identify discriminative facility Chiu et al. (1995) 
focused on the tendency to encode conditionally (recognizing the relationship between 
situational factors and behavioral responses). As a measure of this ability, Chiu et al. 
(1995) provided participants with two passages of text that did not include any trait 
descriptions or conditional propositions. In both cases, participants were asked to read 
and subsequently summarize the passages. The number of stories where the participant 
provided situational or state explanations (e.g., “Brad was mean because he was 
running late”) constituted conditional explanations (i.e., discriminative facility). 
Additionally, unconditional explanations (e.g., “Brad was mean because he is a jerk”) 
were measured by counting the number of stories where participants listed global 
dispositional characterizations of the main character in the story.
Though passage coding is an established approach to measuring discriminative 
facility, it is clearly a time intensive procedure. This measure necessitates the reading 
of each participant’s summaries and subsequently identifying conditional and 
unconditional explanations within each. Additionally, this requires the use of 
independent coders, which is costly in numerous ways (e.g., time and money). One of 
the first goals for the present dissertation was to identify or if necessary devise a more 
easily scored scale designed to tap discriminative facility.
An Examination of a Related Construct and the Implications for DF: Study 1
Self-monitoring: A related construct. Self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974) has been 
characterized as the degree to which individuals alter their behavior based on features
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within a situation. Snyder (1974) proposed that people vary in their tendency to modify 
their behavior according to the social context. This construct has generated a 
large body of research over the past few decades (e.g.. Funder & Harris, 1986; Mill, 
1984; Riggio & Friedman, 1982; Snyder, Berscheid, & Matwychuk, 1988; Snyder & 
Tanke, 1976). Generally, individuals are categorized as high self-monitors or low self­
monitors. High self-monitors modify their behavior in response to elements of the 
situation. Low self-monitors behave consistently with their attitudes regardless of the 
situation. Initially, Snyder (1974) proposed a 25-item paper and pencil questionnaire 
that was designed to tap this distinction. Since that time, the scale has been revised to 
an 18-item instrument (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985).
Although the Self-Monitoring Scale is widely used, controversy over self­
monitoring as a multidimensional construct has emerged (e.g., Briggs & Cheek, 1988; 
Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980; Lennox & Wolfe, 1984). Briggs, Cheek, and Buss 
(1980) argued that the original Self-Monitoring Scale tapped three underlying 
dimensions: acting, extraversion, and other-directedness. The revised 18-item Self- 
Monitoring Scale was proposed to tap two major factors: public performing and other- 
directedness. Public performing comprises acting and extraversion and is measured by 
statements such as “I would probably make a good actor.” Other-directedness involves 
adjusting one’s behavior in response to others and is measured by statements such as 
“In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different 
persons.” Other-directedness most directly involves sensitivity to changes in the 
situation.
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Given the common thread of sensitivity to situational details, self-monitoring 
in general, and other-directedness in particular, appear similar to discriminative 
facility. However, the exact relationship between discriminative facility and self­
monitoring (including the subscale: other-directedness) is unknown. Persons high in 
discriminative facility should be more aware of the influence of the social situation on 
others’ behavior than those low in discriminative facility. Consequently, they would be 
expected to use this information when explaining others’ behavior. However, unlike 
self-monitoring which has elicited a large body of research (e.g., Snyder, Berscheid, & 
Matwychuk, 1988; Snyder & Tanke, 1976), investigations of discriminative facility 
have been less numerous. Therefore, the extent to which these two constructs overlap 
remains an empirical question. Chiu et al. ( 1995) examined the relationship between 
self-monitoring and social interaction quality; however, they did not examine the 
relationship between self-monitoring and discriminative facility. Given that self­
monitoring is a widely validated construct that can be tapped with an established scale, 
if the two constructs do not differ, using the existing Self-Monitoring Scale would be 
the preferred method of measuring discriminative facility. Study I was a replication 
and extension of Chiu et al. (1995), that examined the relationship between 
discriminative facility and self-monitoring in individuals’ explanations of positive and 
negative behavior.
Specifically, study 1 examined the relationship between discriminative facility 
and self-monitoring. Discriminative facility encompasses the tendency to be sensitive 
to the relationship between situational cues and other people’s behavior
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(Chiu et al., 1995; Wright & Mischel, 1987). Self-monitoring involves being sensitive 
to situational cues and altering one's own behavior as a result (Snyder, 1974).
Although seemingly related, the exact relationship between discriminative facility 
(DF+ and DF-) and self-monitoring was unknown. Therefore, the extent to which 
these constructs are related was of interest. As an extension of Chiu et al. (1995), 
potential for discriminative facility for positive behavior (i.e., dismissing positive 
behavior by attributing it to the situation, DF+) as well as negative behavior 
(i.e., excusing negative behavior by attributing it to the situation, DF-) was 
investigated.
Understanding Others’ Positive and Negative Behavior and the Utility of DF: 
Study 2: Part A
Chiu et al. (1995) suggested that discriminative facility was associated with 
positive social interactions. However, they found support for this claim while 
investigating responses to negative behavior in negative situations (what will be 
referred to subsequently as DF-). Chiu et al. (1995) did not consider the consequences 
of discriminative facility in response to positive behavior (what will be referred to 
subsequently as DF+). Thus, the suggestion that discriminative facility (DF-/DF-I-) is 
always beneficial must be examined further.
The superiority of the analysis of events in terms of situational factors (DF) is 
clear when one considers many of the dispositional biases proposed within 
psychology, specifically the attribution literature. For example, the Fundamental 
Attribution Error (Heider, 1958; Jones & Harris, 1967; Ross, 1977) occurs when
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individuals neglect situational factors and rely upon dispositional explanations of an 
individual’s behavior. Similarly, the Actor-Observer Effect (Jones & Nisbett, 1972) is 
defined as the tendency to recognize the influence of situational factors on oneself but 
to neglect situational factors and adhere to trait attributions for others’ behavior. Both 
of these biases exemplify the tendency of perceivers to ignore situational constraints 
inappropriately. Similarly, often victims are blamed for their fate due to the lack of 
importance assigned to situational factors (Carli & Leonard, 1989; Summers & 
Feldman, 1984). Thus, sensitivity to situational nuances (i.e., discriminative facility) is 
important.
However, the attribution and social cognition literatures suggest that 
discriminative facility may be more of an asset when one is interpreting negative 
behaviors (DF-) in comparison to positive behaviors (DF+). Chiu et ai. (1995) posited 
that discriminative facility would have positive interpersonal effects across situations 
(interpreting both positive and negative behavior). Chiu’s participants rated the quality 
of several recent interactions on two dimensions: attainment of goal(s) and emotional 
consequences for the relationship. Responses to the two questions for each interaction 
were multiplied and then the products were averaged to form an index measuring 
quality o f social interaction. Discriminative facility (more specifically DF-) was 
positively related to social interaction quality. Chiu et al. (1995) argued that 
conditional encoding allowed individuals to avoid broad, unqualified generalizations. 
Moreover, they suggested that this discriminating tendency, when applied to oneself, 
might provide a self-preservation advantage such that it allows for the avoidance of
D iscrim inative F acility  9
self-blame for negative events. However, as noted by Chiu et al. (1995), most of the 
trait descriptions (unconditional encodings) in their participants’ summaries were 
negative due to the somewhat negative tone and the somewhat negative behavior 
displayed in both stories. Arguably, the reliance on material of a negative nature could 
affect subsequent results. Negative behavior is assigned a greater weight when forming 
impressions (Fiske, 1980; Hamilton & Zanna, 1972; Ostrom & Davis, 1979). 
Furthermore, we have a tendency to attend to negative information (e.g., automatic 
vigilance, Pratto & John, 1991).
In cases of negative behaviors, the benefit of discriminative facility (DF-) to 
personal relationships is apparent. Qualifying the circumstances for an individual’s 
negative behavior, or alternatively recognizing the impact of negative situational 
factors upon behavior, is an advantage. For example, if we observe a colleague 
perform poorly and reason that circumstances precluded her success, arguably we will 
be better liked than if we conclude she is foolish. However, what if she had been 
successful? Would it still be advantageous to explain the behavior conditionally? In 
this circumstance, discriminative facility (DF+) would lead one to emphasize the 
context for her success (e.g., luck) rather than her talent. Certainly, this could impede 
positive interpersonal feelings. Consistent with this reasoning, Fincham and O ’Leary 
(1983) found dissatisfaction in marriage was associated with attributing positive 
behavior to unstable causes. Furthermore, relationship satisfaction is related to giving 
one’s partner credit for positive events in the relationship (e.g., Jacobson, McDonald, 
Follette, & Berley, 1985; Kelley, 1979; Thompson & Kelley, 1981).
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Therefore, it would be interesting to examine the implications of discriminative 
facility in positive situations (DF+). Would the same positive interpersonal 
relationships manifest for individuals who conditionally encoded in positive 
situations? Taylor and Koivumaki (1976) found that individuals were more likely to 
view individuals with whom they were acquainted (e.g., spouse, friend) as responsible 
for positive actions and were less likely to attribute negative actions to those with 
whom they had a high degree of acquaintanceship. Discriminative facility may not 
always be the best choice for successful interpersonal relations. Certain behaviors 
(e.g., positive behaviors) may call for dispositional explanations.
Therefore, one purpose of study 2 was to examine whether discriminative 
facility (DF+/DF-) is always beneficial in relationships, or whether, in certain 
situations (when one is attempting to explain someone else’s positive behaviors) it can 
actually be detrimental.
Managing People: Study 2 Part B
The second aspect of Thorndike’s (1920) definition of social intelligence was 
the management of others. Within the social intelligence literature. Ford and Tisak 
(1983) equated social intelligence with behavioral performance. Orlik’s (1978) review 
of the social intelligence literature included social influence as an aspect of social 
intelligence. However, the concept of social intelligence has not been the focus of 
much research within the social influence literature. Nonetheless, a variety of other 
factors such as situational constraints, goals, and individual differences have received 
attention in the social influence literature.
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Researchers have developed a variety of taxonomies to characterize influence 
tactics by identifying common strategies (e.g., Canary, Cody, & Mars ton, 1986; 
Marwell & Schmitt, 1967; Rule & Bisanz, 1987; Rule, Bisanz, & Kohn, 1985). One 
common method used to develop these taxonomies involves participants listing 
common strategies that they use in different situations (Falbo, 1977). Another popular 
approach entails providing the participant with a list of common techniques and asking 
the participant to indicate the likelihood that they would use each of the techniques 
(e.g., direct request, coercion) across a variety of situations (Canary, Cody, & Marston, 
1986).
Factors such as goals and potential targets have been determined to impact 
strategy selection (Cody, Canary, & Smith, 1994; Cody & McLaughlin, 1980; Miller, 
Boster, Roloff, & Seibold, 1977). Cody and his colleagues have completed numerous 
investigations aimed at categorizing common goal types (Canary, Cody, & Marston, 
1986; Cody & McLaughlin, 1980; Cody, Woelfel, & Jordan, 1983). Cody, Canary, & 
Smith (1987) (as cited in Canary, Cody, & Marston, 1986) identified fourteen different 
goal types (e.g., initiate relationship, gain assistance-professor). For each of these, a 
unique situation was presented with a designated goal. For example, one scenario was 
depicted as giving advice to a friend. The situation was described as involving a close 
friend that is doing poorly academically. The goal was to convince the friend to pay 
more attention to class work and less attention to extracurricular activities. To examine 
the impact of this situation upon strategy selection, Canary, Cody, and Marston (1986) 
provided participants with a set of strategies. Next, participants were asked to rate the
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likelihood that they would use each of the strategies to advise their friend. A similar 
methodology was used in study 2 of the present dissertation.
Compared to situational factors, internal factors (i.e., individual differences) 
have not received as much attention as potential mediators of strategy selection. 
Individual difference variables have in general been considered as target (recipient of 
persuasion) factors (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986; Eagly & Warren, 
1976; Rhodes & Wood, 1992) rather than as source factors. Nonetheless, some factors 
such as locus of control (Canary, Cody, & Miu-ston, 1986), machiavellianism (Falbo, 
1977), neuroticism (Buss, Gomes, Higgins, & Lauterbach, 1987), and self-monitoring 
(Caldwell & Burger, 1997) have been found to influence strategy choice.
For example, Caldwell and Burger (1997) found high self-monitoring (i.e., 
using situational cues to direct one’s behavior) was related to greater flexibility in 
choice of influence strategies. These findings highlighted the impact of individual 
differences upon strategy selection and repertoire breadth. Moreover, they suggested 
that sensitivity to situational nuances (i.e., discriminative facility) may impact 
interpersonal compliance. Similarly, it was hypothesized that utilizing discriminative 
facility would affect an individual’s appraisal of the situation, sensitize the individual 
to situational cues that could suggest one influence strategy over another, and result in 
the selection of more varied techniques of compliance in goal attainment.
O ven’iew o f the Studies: Study I replicated and extended Chiu et al. (1995), by 
examining the relationship between discriminative facility and self-monitoring in 
explaining positive and negative behavior.
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Study 2 had two purposes. One purpose was to examine whether discriminative 
facility was more beneficial in response to negative behavior than in response to
positive behavior. Discriminative facility was expected to be related to better quality 
of social interactions when explaining negative behavior (DF-). However, for positive 
behavior, discriminative facility (DF+) was expected to be related to poorer quality of 
social interactions.
Another purpose of study 2 was to investigate the impact of discriminative 
facility upon social influence strategy choice. As noted earlier, high self-monitoring 
has been found to be related to breadth of strategy choice (Bell & Daly, 1984;
Caldwell & Burger, 1997). Given that both self-monitoring and discriminative facility 
emphasize situational sensitivity, it was expected that discriminative facility
(DF+ and DF-) should also be positively related to strategy breadth.
Study 1
Study 1 examined the relationship between discriminative facility and self­
monitoring. Also, extending Chiu et al. (1995), the implications of discriminative 
facility for positive behavior (i.e., dismissing positive behavior by attributing it to the 
situation. High DF+) as well as negative behavior (i.e., excusing negative behavior by 
attributing it to the situation. High DF-) were investigated. In order to examine these 
issues, participants completed the Self-Monitoring Scale (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985) 
and two measures o f discriminative facility: Chiu’s passage summary method and the
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newly created discriminative facility Likert measure. The relationship between the 
three measures was examined.
Method
Participants
A total of 78 college students had complete data on all instruments of 
interest. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 46 years, with a median age of 
19 years.
Materials
Self-monitoring. Participants completed the revised Self-Monitoring Scale 
(Gangestad & Snyder, 1985). This scale measures an individual’s tendency to monitor 
or adjust behavior based on the social situation (see Appendix A). Eighteen items are 
presented in a true/false format. After reverse scoring several items, a composite is 
computed by summing across items. Higher scores reflect a higher self-monitoring 
tendency. Gangestad and Snyder (1985) reported an alpha = .70. In the present study, 
an average composite was calculated based on responses to the 18 items.
In addition, a subset of the 18 items has been reported to represent “other- 
directedness” (Briggs & Cheek, 1988; Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980). These items 
focus on altering behavior in order to obtain goals that involve others. Because these 
items most closely overlap with discriminative facility, the correlation between 
discriminative facility and other-directedness might be larger than the correlation 
between discriminative facility and the overall self-monitoring score. The five items 
representing “other-directedness” are asterisked in Appendix A.
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Discriminative facility. Participants were asked to read, summarize, and answer 
questions about four passages to measure discriminative facility (see Appendix B). 
Half of the passages were written to create a moderately positive impression of the 
main character. The remaining two passages were written to create a moderately 
negative impression of the main character. The characters were consistent when 
constructing passages (i.e., Scott or Brad) resulting in four possible outcomes (i.e., 
positive Brad, positive Scott, negative Brad, and negative Scott). The passages were 
written as descriptions of typical events within the life of Brad or Scott. Within each 
subset of passages (i.e.. positive Brad and negative Brad), the gist of the passages was 
kept the same; however, various behaviors were altered to reflect the opposite 
impression (i.e., positive or negative). For example in the negative Brad passage. Brad 
hides a coffee cup that he breaks. In contrast, in the Brad positive passage. Brad 
secretly replaces the cup. The negative Brad passage appears below:
B rad com pleted  his M asters in Business Adm inistration an d ranked in the top  ten percen t o f  
his gradu atin g  class. He secured  a position  a t Paxsvell Incorporated  (a large m arketing firm ). Brad  
w anted to  advan ce into corpora te  managem ent. A dvancem ent in the com pany w as very com petitive. A 
cou p le o f  B rad 's cow orkers w ere also looking to  advance in the com pany. B rad  w orked long hours at 
his jo b . On one occasion , B rad  knocked his b o ss ’s coffee cup to the ground. H e p ick ed  up the broken 
p iece s  and  threw  them  in the dum pster. B rad noticed his boss looking f o r  his cup, but sa id  he d id  not 
know  anything abou t it. B rad's boss often w orked late. One day. B ra d ’s boss asked  him to Join him fo r  
g o lf  the ne.xt day. Although B rad d id  not care  fo r  golf, he to ld  h is boss tha t it w as one o f  his favorite  
sp o rts  a n d  th a t he  w o j  looking fo rw a rd  to playing. That evening. B rad  pu rch ased  a se t o f  g o lf  clubs 
with a well-know n bran d  and  o th er p ieces o f  equipment. B rad knew that office po litics w ere important. 
B rad w on dered  w hat p eo p le  thought o f  him in the office. B rad regularly sen t b irthday cards to  his boss.
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On occasion , he brought donuts fo r  his boss and  com plim ented h is appearance. Once, a cow orker w as 
on his w ay to  g ive  a presen tation  and n oticed a stain on his shirt. He asked B rad to look a t his shirt. 
B rad to ld  him that the stain w as not noticeable. The next m orning B rad w as preparing fo r  a meeting. A 
co w orker ca lled  an d  sta ted  that he had ca r  trouble. The cow orker w as 2 blocks from  work an d asked  
f o r  a ride. B rad to ld  him that he cou ld  not help him. B rad suggested  he try som eone else. A fter working 
f o r  the firm  f o r  f iv e  years. B rad received  a prom otion.
The passages were written to convey the intended positive or negative 
impression; however, there was a degree of ambiguity in each paragraph to allow for 
attributing behaviors to either the person or situation. In order to increase this 
ambiguity, trait descriptions were not included in the passages.
Discriminative facilitv: Passage coding. In the primary measure of 
discriminative facility (as in Chiu et al., 1995), coders who were blind to the 
participants’ self-monitoring scores coded participants’ passage summaries. One coder 
was also blind to the experimental hypotheses. The scoring was based on the 
framework of Chiu et al. (1995). The passage summaries were coded for conditional 
explanations and unconditional explanations. Conditional explanations provide a state 
or situational motive for behavior beyond a trait description. In general, conditional 
explanations reflect high discriminative facility. Unconditional explanations rely on 
personal attributions as motives for behavior and therefore reflect low discriminative 
facility.
Two coders independently scored the participants’ summaries using a gist 
criterion. In this coding scheme, propositions were identified in the negative stories 
that indicated an “excuse making” response or a “blaming” response. For example, an
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excuse making response would be “Brad was under pressure so he had to hide the 
cup.” Whereas, a blaming response would be “Brad should be ashamed — he is 
dishonest.” The excuse-making category (High DF-) represents discriminative facility 
whereas the blaming response (Low DF-) reflects an unconditional explanation 
(i.e., nondiscriminating response). The number of stories (0 or 1) where “Excusing” 
(i.e.. High DF-) or “Blaming” (i.e.. Low DF-) appeared for the negative passage was 
recorded. In the negative situations, participants that used “Excuse making” (i.e.. High 
DF-) were given a “ 1" for the DF- factor and a “0” for the “Blaming” category. In 
contrast, participants that used “Blaming” (i.e.. Low DF-) when explaining negative 
behavior were given a “ 1" for that category and a “0” for the “Excusing” category.
For the positive stories, propositions that praised the character (e.g., “Scott is 
nice”) were coded as an unconditional explanation (Low DF+). Alternatively, when 
participants dismissed positive behavior (e.g., “Scott only helped to get ahead”), these 
statements were coded as conditional explanations (High DF+). The number of stories 
(0 or 1) where “Dismissing” (i.e.. High DF+) or “Praising” (i.e.. Low DF+) appeared 
for the positive passage was recorded. Participants that used “Dismissing” were given 
a “ 1” for the High DF+ factor and a “0” for the “Praising” category. In contrast, 
participants that used “Praising” when explaining positive behavior were given a “ I” 
for that category and a “0” for the “Dismissing” category. ’
Initially, a coding scheme was established with examples of the four categories 
(Excuse; High DF-; Blame: Low DF-; Dismiss: High DF+; Praise: Low DF+). The 
coders coded the first 5 packets together to establish a common understanding of the
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criteria. The remaining packets were coded independently using the established coding 
scheme. Discrepancies were resolved by discussion.
Discriminative Facility: Likert scale. The second measure designed to assess 
discriminative facility was an index comprised of several Likert items that asked 
participants to attribute responsibility for the character’s behavior to something about 
the person or to situational factors. The items were derived to match each respective 
story. Thus, four instruments were designed (i.e., one for each passage). Participants 
responded to several questions about the main character (see Appendix C) that were 
answered on a 7-point Likert scale. For example, in reference to the negative Brad 
passage, participants rated ‘T he main reason behind Brad lying to his boss was;” I (He 
is that kind of person) to 7 (Something about the situation). In contrast, after reading 
the positive Brad passage, participants rated ‘T h e  main reason behind Brad buying his 
boss a replacement cup was:” 1 (He is that kind of person) to 7 (Something about the 
situation).
An index was formed for the positive (DF+) and negative (DF-) passages 
separately. A few items were reverse-scored and an average discriminative facility 
score was computed. For this measure, a higher number reflected a conditional 
explanation (i.e., considering the situation). In contrast, lower numbers indicated an 
unconditional description. Providing conditional explanations represents 
discriminative facility (High DF+ or High DF-), whereas unconditional explanations 
(Low DF4- or Low DF-) depict a nondiscriminating pattern.
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Manipulation checks. Participants rated the main character of each story on a 
number of dimensions (e.g., friendliness). The items were answered on a 3-point scale 
(see Appendix D) with higher numbers reflecting a more positive impression. 
Participants rated how “friendly,” “likable,” and “caring” the main character was with 
I (not at all), 2 (moderately), to 3 (extremely). Additionally, two items were included 
that asked the participants to judge the main character’s behavior on a 7-point scale. 
The first item used 1 (Bad) to 7 (Good) as anchors for the judgment. The second item 
had 1 (Negative) to 7 (Positive) as anchors.
Procedure
Initially, participants were tested in departmental mass testing sessions. They 
completed several instruments including the Self-Monitoring Scale. During the 
remainder of the semester, in smaller experimental sessions, participants completed 
the remaining materials.
After arriving at the laboratory, participants were informed that the project was 
examining the processing of information in social situations. Each participant received 
a paper-clipped booklet containing the previously described materials. Each 
participant was instructed to complete the materials in the order established by the 
experimenter. After consenting, following Chiu et al. (1995), participants were 
provided the following instructions: “In this part of the study, we will give you two 
short stories to read. Then you will be asked to tell the stories again in your own 
words. Later we will ask another participant to read your version of the stories and
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answer some questions concerning what kind of person the characters described in the 
stories are.”
The participants were asked to retell the stories in their own words and to use 
simple sentences. The participants were told that they might want to include their 
impression of the character. Additionally, they were told that the reader of their stories 
would not be asked about anything that happened in the stories.
Each participant received one passage about Brad and another about Scott; 
one o f these passages depicted positive behavior, and the other depicted negative 
behavior. Presentation of the passages was counterbalanced across participants such 
that half of the subjects completed the positive excerpt first and the remaining subjects 
completed the negative excerpt first.
Participants read and summarized the first passage. In between passages, 
participants completed a demographic questionnaire as a filler task. Next, participants 
read and summarized the second passage with the same set of instructions.
Participants were instructed to wait until told to move forward to the 
next instrument. At this point, participants completed the discriminative 
facility Likert scale measure for each passage (see Appendix C) assessing participants’ 
attributions concerning the causes of Brad and Scott’s behavior. The scales 
were presented in the same order that the participants received their 
passages. Participants were informed that they could refer back to the passages if 
needed.
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Next, participants recorded their impression of the main characters across 
several dimensions (e.g., likability). Following this, participants were thanked for their 
participation and debriefed.
Results
Manipulation Checks
In order to assess the manipulation of valence in the situations, the participants’ 
impressions of the characters were collapsed into two valence indices for the positive 
and negative passages. One measure was calculated from the mean of the three items 
that asked the participants about their specific impression of the characters themselves 
(e.g., likability). The second measure was constructed from the mean of 
the two items that examined their impressions of the character’s behavior 
(e.g., good/bad). To examine the internal consistency of the scales, Cronbach 
coefficient alphas were computed for the two scales for each scenario (i.e., positive or 
negative). For the positive likability items alpha = .87, whereas, alpha = .77 for the 
negative likability items. For the two behavior scales alpha = .94 and alpha = .93 for 
the positive and negative scenarios respectively.
Two separate repeated measures ANOVAs confirmed that the passages were 
successful in creating the intended impression (i.e., positive or negative). In the first 
analysis, participants’ impressions of the character in the positive passage and of the 
character in the negative passage were treated as levels of a within-subjects factor. A 
significant difference was found in the impressions of the positive and negative 
passages, F (I, 77) = 83.08, p < .01, with the character in the positive passage
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(M = 2.57, SD = .54; on a 3-point scale) eliciting a more positive impression than the 
character in the negative passage (M = 1.71, SD = .54; on a 3-point scale). 
Additionally, a significant difference was found in the rating of the main character’s 
behavior, F (l, 77) = 83.27, p  < .01, with the positive passage’s character receiving a 
more positive rating (M = 5.45, ^  = 1.56; on a 7-point scale) than the character in the 
negative passage (M = 2.88, SD = 1.54; on a 7-point scale). Therefore, participants 
noticed the intended valence differences in the passages.
Discriminative Facilitv: Passage Coding
Inter-rater reliability estimates were calculated from the passage codings to 
determine the level of agreement between the coders. For each of the four coding 
categories (e.g., excuse), the proportion of agreement was computed. A high level of 
agreement was found across all categories. For the negative situation, participants 
could have clearly “excused” or “blamed,” or not fit with either of those categories.' 
The coders agreed on 91% of the excuse cases and 92% of the blame cases. For the 
positive situation, participants could have clearly “praised” or “dismissed,” or not 
listed any clear fit with those categories.' For the praise category, coders agreed 88% 
of the time. In cases of dismiss, coders agreed at a rate of 97%.
Discriminative Facilitv: Likert Scale
As described previously, the second discriminative facility measure was 
formed from several 7-point Likert items for the negative and the positive conditions 
respectively. To identify the best items for the final discriminative facility Likert 
scales, internal consistency coefficients were computed to determine which items
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produced the best fit. From the original six items, four items were found to provide the 
best fit (i.e., highest alphas) for both the positive and negative conditions separately. 
The items are asterisked in Appendix C. Discriminative facility scores were calculated 
by averaging the four items. Therefore, each participant had a score that measured the 
tendency to recognize situational influences in a positive situation and a second 
average for the negative situation. The positive items produced alpha = .76, whereas, 
alpha = .78 for the negative items. Overall, the mean discriminative facility score for 
the positive passage was 3.24 (SD = 1.45) and 3.80 (SD = 1.46) for the negative 
passage. Thus, participants in general had a tendency to credit the person in the 
positive condition. In the negative condition, participants’ scores were slightly higher 
toward the situation. Yet, the average was below the midpoint towards the 
dispositional endpoint. These findings were consistent with the coding results. 
However, to establish the scale as an adequate discriminative facility measure, a more 
in-depth comparison was needed.
Comparisons of Discriminative Facilitv
To assess the validity of the Likert discriminative facility approach, 
intercorrelations (Pearson’s r) were computed between the two discriminative facility 
approaches. The coefficients appear in Table 1.
As expected when the scenarios were positive, the more participants praised 
the character in their passage summaries the less likely they were to weight situational 
factors in their ratings of the character’s behavior, r(76) = -.43, p < .01. Also, when 
participants dismissed positive behavior in their passage summaries they were more
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likely to weight the situation in their ratings r(76) = .40, £  < .01. When the scenarios 
were negative, participants exhibited a similar pattern. Participants who blamed the 
character in their passage summaries were more likely to attribute responsibility to the 
character in their ratings of his behavior r(76) = -.55, g < .01. In addition, excusing 
negative behavior in the passage summaries corresponded to higher ratings of 
situational influences on the Likert items r(76) = .53, g < .01. These strong, consistent 
correlations suggest that the Likert scale is a reasonable measure of discriminative 
facility.
Self-Monitoring
The overall self-monitoring composite (average of the 18 items scored 0 or 1; 
higher score indicating high self-monitoring) for the group was .48 (SD = .20). To 
identify whether self-monitoring was a distinct construct from discriminative facility, 
intercorrelations were computed between self-monitoring, other-directedness, and the 
two measures of discriminative facility. The correlation coefficients are presented in 
Table 2 and Table 3.
As can be seen in these two tables, most of the correlations between self­
monitoring and discriminative facility did not approach significance (and their 
absolute magnitude tended to be very small, rs < .15). It appears that discriminative 
facility and self-monitoring are constructs that tap different situational sensitivities. 
Interestingly, although non-significant, the strongest correlation for the self­
monitoring composite was in a consistent direction. For example, blaming tended to 
be negatively related to self-monitoring, r(71 ) = -.14. Thus, low self-monitoring
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(i.e., decreased situational sensitivity) was related to decreased situational sensitivity 
as assessed by the coding method. However, overall, the low correlations suggest that 
these two constructs are unrelated.
In order to examine the relationship between self-monitoring and general 
discriminative facility (DF-t- and DF- combined), an overall index of discriminative 
facility was computed for the coding method, and another index was derived for the 
Likert method. In the coding method, the index was calculated by combining the 
categories for low discriminative facility (e.g., praise and blame) and high 
discriminative facility (e.g., excuse and dismiss). The range was 0 (e.g., did not 
use either praise or blame) to 2 (e.g., used both praise and blame) for each of these 
new combined categories. An overall composite was calculated by subtracting the low 
discriminative facility combination score from the high discriminative facility 
combination score. The possible range for this difference score (the overall DF 
measure) was -2 (low discriminative facility) to 2 (high discriminative facility).
For the Likert approach, discriminative facility scores for the positive and negative 
passages were summed resulting in a possible score of 2 to 14, with 14 reflecting the 
highest level of discriminative facility. The correlation between these two indices was 
high, resulting in a significant r(76) = .58. g  = .0001. However, the correlations 
between the overall discriminative facility measures and self-monitoring were much 
lower and nonsignificant. The correlation between the overall discriminative facility 
coding measure and self-monitoring resulted in a nonsignificant r(7I) = .14. The
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correlation between the overall discriminative facility Likert scale measure and self­
monitoring resulted in a nonsignificant r(7I) = .04.
Study I Discussion 
Several interesting findings emerged from study 1. This study found that 
discriminative facility could be assessed by the use of a Likert scale. This is not 
surprising given that Chiu et al. (1995) used an instrument (e.g., monitoring-blunting; 
Miller & Mangan, 1983) designed to tap situational sensitivity to hypothetical 
situations as a measure of discriminative facility. However, this scale could not be 
used in the present study because it focused only on negative situations. One strength 
of the present study was that It extended the measurement of discriminative facility to 
positive behavior. The positive and negative discriminative facility scales were both 
found to have acceptable levels of reliability. Additionally, the scales were found to 
share a significant portion of variance with the original passage coding measure of 
discriminative facility. Given its ease of administration, the Likert approach seems to 
be the preferred method to measure discriminative facility.
Additionally, although Chiu et al. (1995) also measured self-monitoring, they 
did not attempt to identify its relationship to discriminative facility. Therefore, the 
present study was an attempt to establish whether self-monitoring tapped 
discriminative facility in positive and negative situations. Discriminative facility was 
found to share little with self-monitoring. One possible explanation for this is that 
situational details are important for both constructs but for different reasons. Thus, the 
focus of high self-monitors involves adjusting one’s own behavior because of self­
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presentation goals (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000; Snyder, 1974). In contrast, 
discriminative facility goes beyond self-presentation and encompasses a broader 
knowledge-seeking component (about the influences on other’s behavior). Thus, both 
constructs involve the recognition of situational details but the representations of the 
information gleaned and the use of that information are different. Arguably, 
discriminative facility results in a more differentiated interpretation of the situation 
and the actors within the situation.
As noted earlier, DF- has been associated with more successful social 
interactions (e.g., Chiu et al., 1995). The results for self-monitoring are somewhat 
mixed within the social skills literature. Mill (1984) found that high self-monitors 
were better at interpreting changes in vocal expression (e.g., voice intonation). 
Additionally, Geizer, Rarick, and Soldow, (1977) found that self-monitoring was 
related to detecting deception. However, Mill (1984) found that high self-monitors 
were rated as poorer in portraying empathy convincingly in comparison to low self­
monitors. It seems clear that discriminative facility and self-monitoring are different 
from one another.
Study 2
As noted earlier, the positive relationship between discriminative facility and 
social interaction quality was found based on responses to negative behavior (DF-). 
Therefore, in study 2, the relationship between discriminative facility and the quality 
of social interactions was further examined. As an extension of Chiu et al. (1995), the 
effects of discriminative facility in response to positive behavior (DF-h) as well as
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negative behavior (DF-) were investigated. Of interest was whether discriminative 
facility is more beneficial in response to negative behavior than in response to positive 
behavior. Discriminative facility (DF-) was expected to be related to better quality of 
social interactions when explaining negative behavior. However, for positive 
behavior, discriminative facility (DF+) was expected to be related to poorer quality of 
social interactions. Discriminative facility in positive situations would involve taking 
the situation into account when understanding positive behavior (i.e., dismissing the 
positive behavior). This failure to give credit to the individual was expected to be 
associated with lower social interaction quality.
The second part of study 2 examined the relationship between discriminative 
facility and social influence strategy choice. Given that individuals who rely on 
discriminative facility are more sensitive to situational details, they should alter their 
strategy choice across different situations significantly more than nondiscriminating 
individuals. Discriminative facility is believed to provide a differentiated 
understanding of the situation and goal(s). Subsequently, a broader range of tactics 
was expected to be endorsed by individuals who are high in discriminative facility 
(DF+ and DF-).
In the first of two sessions, in addition to completing the discriminative facility 
Likert measure of study I, participants completed an index of social interaction 
quality measuring goal acquisition and interpersonal satisfaction (used by Chiu et al., 
1995). In session I, the consequence of discriminative facility (in terms of social 
interaction quality) for explaining both positive and negative behavior was examined.
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In a second session, participants rated their use of several different social 
influence strategies in 14 different situations. For those that rely on discriminative 
facility as a mechanism of encoding, a wider range of strategy approach was expected.
Method
Participants
One hundred twenty-two participants completed both sessions of study 2. The 
participants ranged in age from 18 years to 55 years with a median age of 21 years. 
Materials
Oualitv of social interactions. The Quality of Social Interactions Survey 
(Chiu et al., 1995) is a self-report instrument in which participants rate the quality of 
four recent personal interactions on two dimensions: attainment of goal(s) and 
emotional consequence(s) of the interaction for the relationship (see Appendix E). The 
social situations include interactions with a professor, a parent, a close friend, and a 
person they disliked. For example, participants are asked to recall the most recent 
instance in which they interacted with a close friend alone and face-to-face for more 
than 15 minutes. For goal attainment, participants are asked “Do you feel that you 
attained your personal goal in the interaction?” Participants indicate the degree of their 
success on a scale from I to 3: with 1 = “no,” 2 = “to some extent,” or 3 = “yes.” For 
emotional consequence, participants are asked to rate the quality of their relationship 
after the interaction on a I to 3 scale: with I = “got worse,” 2 = “remained the same,” 
or 3 = “got better.” Responses to the two questions for each social interaction are
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multiplied. Next, the products are averaged across the four social situations to form an 
index measuring quality of social interaction.
Discriminative facilitv: Likert scale. The same four passages presented in study 
1 were used to tap discriminative facility (see Appendix B). Two passages reflected a 
positive impression of the main character. The remaining two passages gave a negative 
impression.
The discriminative facility Likert indices derived in study 1 (see Appendix C) 
were used for the positive (DF+) and negative (DF-) passages separately. As stated 
earlier, higher numbers reflected greater discriminative facility (High DF+, High DF-). 
In contrast, lower numbers indicate a nondiscriminating explanation 
(Low DF+, Low DF-).
Goal Tvpes and Stratesv Selection
Goal tvpe/situation. Fourteen common situations, each with a desired goal and 
complemented by an example (see Appendix F), served as the goal type instrument 
(Canary, Cody, & Marston, 1986). For example, in the situation entitled “Routine 
Activities-Friends,” the general goal listed for this scenario is to have a routine night 
out with friends. This is followed by a specific example that the participant is asked to 
imagine: “You and your friends haven’t gone out for a night on the town in some time 
and you want to persuade them into going with you this Friday evening.” The 
remaining 13 situations included: trying to get out of a speeding ticket, advising a 
friend about their study habits, breaking off a dating relationship, persuading an 
acquaintance to help you with your homework, persuading your landlord to perform
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maintenance, initiating a relationship, persuading a professor to let you into a class, 
persuading an acquaintance to talk to a friend about his/her drinking problem, 
persuading your father to relax, persuading your partner to meet your relatives, 
persuading your neighbor to keep the noise down, persuading a stranger to participate 
in a class project for you, and persuading your parents to send you money (see 
Appendix F). Participants are asked to imagine each situation separately and are 
provided with a list of eight persuasion tactics/strategies that they rate independently.
Strategies. The tactics include direct request, ingratiation, compromise, 
negative manipulation of feelings (e.g., sulking), rational arguments, coercive 
influence (e.g., threaten to punish), referent influence (e.g., appeal to the relationship), 
and avoidance. Each tactic with an accompanying description is provided below.
Direct request. “Without going into details. I’d simply ask, ‘Can you do 
it?’ I wouldn’t feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my 
request.”
Ingratiation. “I’d put on my happy face and act particularly nice when 
trying to persuade him/her. I’d get him/her in the right “frame of mind’ before 
asking.”
Compromise. “I would suggest that we talk over some 
compromise, and work something out.”
Negative manipulation of feelings. “I would show how 
disappointed I was in him/her. I’d act sad, hurt, and/or dejected when trying to 
influence him/her to make them feel guilty, etc.”
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Rational arguments. “I would fully explain to them the reasons 
why I wanted the person(s) to agree with my request.”
Coercion. “I would threaten to punish the person(s) if he/she/they 
did not go along with my request.”
Referent appeal. “I would appeal to the person(s) by referring to 
the nature of our relationship and our sense of togetherness and mutual liking.” 
Avoidance. “I probably wouldn’t do anything about persuading the 
person(s) in this situation. I’d drop the matter and just hope that the person(s) 
would come around.”
Respondents were asked to rate each strategy as described above in each situation on a 
I to 7 scale with 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree). As in Canary, Cody, and 
Marston (1986), a description of each tactic was presented for each situation 
(see Appendix F).
Manipulation checks. As in experiment 1, to check the intended yalence 
manipulation, participants rated the main character of each story (see Appendix D) on 
a number of dimensions (e.g., friendliness, likability, and caring).
Procedure
Session 1. Participants initially completed an informed consent form. In the 
first o f two sessions, the experimenter proyided each participant with a booklet that 
contained seyeral instruments. The social interaction quality inyentory was the first 
instrument completed. Next, participants followed the same Likert scale procedure 
used in study I to tap discriminatiye facility. Participants read one positiye passage
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and one negative passage about Brad and Scott. The passages were counterbalanced as 
before such that, half of the subjects completed the positive passage first and the 
remaining half completed the negative passage first. As before, participants completed 
the Likert item discriminative facility measure asking them to make attributions about 
Brad’s and Scott’s behavior. Similarly, the manipulation check items were included 
which asked the participants to rate the main character on a number of traits and to 
make a Judgment about his behavior.
After completing all instruments including the manipulation checks, 
participants were thanked for their participation. Participants were informed that they 
would complete another task at a later date.
Session 2. In session two, after completing the informed consent, the same 
participants received a stapled packet that contained the 14 different goal-seeking 
situations (adapted from Canary, Cody, & Marston, 1986). Nine random orders of 
situations and strategies were used. Within each packet, the strategies were presented 
in the same order for each situation. Participants were informed that they would be 
rating their use of a given set of strategies across 14 scenarios. Participants were asked 
to imagine themselves in each of the situations and to rate each strategy independently. 
After participants completed the packet, they were thanked for their participation and 
debriefed.
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Results
Manipulation Checks
As in study I, the manipulation of valence in the passages was examined. The 
impression indices for the positive and negative passages were calculated using the 
same items described in study 1. As mentioned previously, the first valence measure 
tapped participants’ impression of the characters themselves (e.g., likability). This 
measure was calculated from the mean of the three items that asked the participants 
about their specific impression of the characters themselves (e.g., likability). The 
second measure reflected judgments of the character’s behavior and was constructed 
from the mean of the two items that examined their impressions of the character’s 
behavior (e.g., good/bad).
Two separate repeated measures ANOVAs confirmed that the passages were 
successful in conveying the intended impression (i.e., positive or negative). In the first 
analysis, participants’ impressions of the character in the positive passage and of the 
character in the negative passage were treated as levels of a within-subjects factor. A 
significant difference was found in the impression ratings, F (l, 121) = 217.38,
£  < .001, with the character in the positive situation (M = 2.47, ^  = .43; on a 
3-point scale) eliciting a more positive impression than the character in the negative 
situation (M = 1.58, SD = .49 on a 3 point-scale). In the second analysis, participants’ 
judgments of the character’s behavior in the positive passage and of the character in
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the negative passage were treated as levels of a within-subjects factor. A significant 
difference was found in the rating of the main character’s behavior,
F (l, 121) = 213.76, E <  .001, with the positive character’s behavior (M = 5.36,
SD = 1.35; on a 7-point scale) receiving a more positive rating than the negative 
character’s behavior (M = 2.63, SD = 1.28; on a 7-point scale).
Discriminative Facilitv; Likert Scale
Discriminative facility was classified by using the same index validated in 
study 1. Using the same four established items, discriminative facility scores for the 
positive (DF+) and negative (DF-) behaviors were computed by averaging across the 
items (see Appendix C).
As before, each participant had a score that measured the tendency to recognize 
situational influences for positive behavior (DF+) and a second score for negative 
behavior (DF-). Internal consistency tests for the positive items (DF-t-) produced 
alpha = .82. Internal consistency (alpha) was .69 for the negative items (DF-).
Participants were classified into discriminative (High DF+, High DF-) and 
nondiscriminative (Low DF+, Low DF-) participants based on their responses to the 
Likert items. Because the scales ranged from 1 to 7, an average above 4 indicated a 
discriminative pattern. That is, the participant was placing more weight on external 
factors when explaining the character’s behavior. Using this strategy, a person’s 
behavior is conditionally represented (i.e., discriminative facility). In contrast, an 
average below 4 reflected an unconditional explanation (i.e., nondiscriminating 
explanation). Thus, the individual was given more responsibility or credit in terms of
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the positive passage. From these divisions, two discriminative facility factors (DF+, 
DF-) were created with two levels each (high, low). Thus, discriminative facility was 
categorized as high or low based on the negative (DF-) and positive (DF+) situations 
separately.
To examine the benefits of discriminative facility in both positive and negative 
situations, a two-way nonorthogonal ANOVA (Appelbaum & Cramer, 1974; O ’Brien, 
1976) was conducted for social interaction quality. The tendency to rely on 
discriminative facility in positive situations (DF+) and the tendency to rely on 
discriminative facility in negative situations (DF-) served as factors. Each factor had 
two levels indicating “high” or “low.”'  A significant main effect was found between 
levels of discriminative facility in negative situations, F (l, 101) = 4.52, p <  .05. As 
expected, high discriminating individuals (DF-) reported higher social interaction 
quality scores, M = 5.83 = .19), than low discriminative (DF-) participants,
M = 5.32 = .15). No other significant effects were found. Thus, discriminating in
positive situations appeared to have no effect upon social interaction quality.
To test the prediction that discriminative facility is related to a broader strategy 
base, a 2 (DF-: High/Low) X 2 (DF+: High/Low) X 14 (Scenarios) X 8 (Strategies) 
repeated measures ANOVA was performed. The main effect for scenario was 
significant F(13, 1222) = 35.82, p < .001. In addition, some strategies in general were 
more popular, producing a significant strategy main effect, F(7, 658) = 241.01,
2  < .001. However, strategy was found to vary across scenarios, such that the scenario 
by strategy interaction was significant, F(91, 8554) = 24.62, p < .001. Finally, as
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predicted, DF- was found to systematically impact strategy choice across various 
scenarios producing a significant DF- by strategy by scenario interaction,
F(91, 8554) = 1.26, p < .05. However, there were no significant main effects or 
interactions with DF+.
Given that discriminative individuals take the situation into account, they were 
expected to exhibit greater flexibility (i.e., variability) in strategy use across situations. 
Because, DF- was consistently found to have a systematic influence, the remaining 
analyses pertain to this encoding approach. Table 4 presents the mean likelihood of 
strategy use across each of the situations for the two levels of DF-. It is important to 
note that a lower number indicates higher likelihood of use.
To tease apart the effects embedded within the three-way interaction, a 
2 (DF-: High/Low) X 8 (Strategy) repeated measures ANOVA was performed for each 
of the 14 scenarios.
Strate2V Preferences
The strategy main effect was significant in all 14 analyses, all 
Fs(7, 735 to 742) _> 58.68, ps < .001. However, this effect was not of central interest. 
Nonetheless, comparisons were made between strategies to identify the more popular 
strategies in general. Given the large number of comparisons possible for the 8 
strategies (i.e., 28 pair-wise comparisons) within each of the 14 scenarios, alpha was 
adjusted to .00013. Table 5 presents the average ratings for each strategy within each 
of the 14 scenarios.
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Overall, across situations, rationalization, with one exception (relational 
initiation/trying to get a date) was the preferred strategy. Ingratiation (exception: third 
party/trying to get a friend to stop drinking), and compromise (exceptions: assistance 
stranger/getting participation from strangers in a class project and third party/trying to 
get a friend to stop drinking) were also popular with the few noted exceptions.
On the other hand, coercion was the least preferred strategy with one exception 
(obligation/getting the landlord to perform maintenance). Other infrequently used 
appeals across situations tended to be negative manipulation (exceptions: 
annoyance/getting neighbor to turn down stereo and bureaucracy/getting out of a 
ticket) and avoidance (exception: bureaucracy/getting out of a ticket and relational 
initiation/trying to get a date). Given that the strategy main effect and subsequent 
comparisons were not o f central interest, they are not discussed in detail. To examine 
all significant comparisons, refer to Table 5.
Effects o f Discriminative Facilitv (DF-)
It was anticipated that for individuals who are high in discriminative facility, a 
broader range of strategies would be selected. Relying on discriminative facility 
encompasses sensitivity to situational differences; thus, this was expected to evoke 
varied strategic solutions for the given goal by discriminative individuals.
Consistent with this prediction, there were significant main effects for discriminative 
facility (indicating more varied strategy use for high DF- participants) for the 
following scenarios: Advice friend, obligation, relational escalation, and third party. 
All F s(l, 105 to 106) > 4 .17 , ps < .05. High discriminating participants were more
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likely to endorse a broader range of strategies (M = 3.85, SD = .64) in comparison to 
low discriminating participants (M = 4.20, SD = .81) when attempting to convince a 
friend to focus on their studies. Similarly, high discriminating participants were 
willing to use a wider range of strategies (M = 3.58. SD = .74) to persuade the landlord 
to fix the plumbing problem in comparison to low discriminators (M = 3.97,
SD = .91). When trying to persuade their partner to meet their relatives, high 
discriminating individuals again endorsed a more flexible strategy base (M = 3.29,
SD = .72) in comparison to low discriminators (M = 3.58, ^  = .70). Finally, to 
convince a friend to discuss the possibility of another friend’s drinking problem, high 
discriminators again endorsed a broader range of tactics (M = 3.61, SD = .80) when 
compared to low discriminators (M = 3.93, SD = .83).
Discriminative Facilitv (DF-) bv Strategv Interactions
Given that individuals who rely on discriminative facility are more sensitive to 
situational details, they should alter their strategy choice across different situations 
significantly more than nondiscriminating individuals. Consistent with the prediction, 
there were significant discriminative facility by strategy interactions in two scenarios. 
A significant strategy by discriminative facility interaction, F(7, 742) = 2.70, g < .01, 
was found when participants considered how to contend with an annoying neighbor. In 
order to identify meaningful cell mean differences without inflating type I error 
drastically, at least a .5 difference between means was considered necessary for future 
comparisons. Three strategies met this criterion: direct request, coercion, and 
compromise. Using the Games-Howell procedure (Toothaker, 1993), comparisons
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were made between levels of discriminative facility. Alpha was adjusted to the .01 
level. High discriminating participants were more likely to endorse using direct request 
(M = 3.58, SD = 2.05) than low discriminating persons (M = 4.65, SD =1.95) when 
confronted with an annoying situation, t(93) = 2.73, p  < .01. Differences in using 
coercion and compromise were found to be nonsignificant. However, interestingly, 
high discriminating individuals endorsed the “more assertive” approaches. That is, 
they rated direct request (M = 3.58, SD = 2.05) and coercion (M = 4.80, SD = 2.29) as 
more likely, whereas, low discriminators rated compromise (M = 2.00, SD = 1.59) as 
more likely.
Additionally, a significant strategy by discriminative facility interaction,
F(7, 742) = 2.84, p  < .01, was found when participants considered convincing their 
friends to go out for a good time (routine activity friend scenario). As before, in order 
to identify meaningful cell mean differences without inflating type I error drastically, 
at least a .5 difference between means was considered necessary for future 
comparisons. The three strategies that met this criterion: direct request, negative 
manipulation, and avoidance, were compared between levels of discriminative facility. 
All comparisons were made at the .01 (alpha) level using the Games-Howell procedure 
(Toothaker, 1993). None of the comparisons were significant; however, the trend of 
the means indicated that high discriminating participants were more likely to endorse 
each of the strategies more than low discriminating individuals.
Given that the previously described DF- main effect for strategy preference 
may be the result of strongly endorsing a select few strategies or mildly endorsing
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several strategies, an additional analysis was conducted to further explore strategic 
flexibility between high and low discriminative (DF-) individuals. Because of the 
greater social cognitive flexibility of high DF- individuals, it is reasonable to predict 
that they would at least be willing to consider, and perhaps would prefer, more 
strategies than low DF- individuals within each scenario. The specific strategies were 
not of interest. Based upon these considerations, a count of the number of strategies 
endorsed was performed within each of the 14 scenarios. Initially the cut-off was set to 
a rating of 4 or less from the 1 to 7 scales, reflecting a willingness to at least consider 
more techniques. A 2 (DF-: High/Low) X 14 (Scenario) repeated measures ANOVA 
was performed on the total counts for each scenario. The interaction between scenario 
and discriminative facility (DF-) was nonsignificant, F(13, 1339) = 1.42, p = .14.
However, a significant main effect was found for scenario,
F(13, 1339) = 24.89, £  < .001. Not surprisingly, this suggests that some scenarios were 
likely to evoke a broader range of tactic consideration in comparison to others. The 
current focus was not to study situations; however, post-hoc comparisons (£ <  .0005) 
indicated that the scenarios clearly separated into two clusters with Ms <4.17 
(bureaucracy, M = 3.51; relational de-escalation, M = 3.92; relational initiation,
M = 4.10; assistance stranger, M = 4.16; and gain-assistance professor, M = 4.17) and 
Ms > 4.82 (third party, M = 4.82; obligation, M = 4.85; advice parent, M = 4.85; 
annoyance, M = 4.88; assistance parent, M = 4.92; routine activities friends, M = 4.96; 
and relational escalation, M = 5.26). Two scenarios that overlapped with both of these 
clusters were advice friend (M = 4.49) and assistance acquaintance (M = 4.52).
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In general, the pattern of means indicated that in those situations where there 
was less familiarity and less relationship closeness (i.e., bureaucracy, relational de- 
escalation, relational initiation, assistance stranger, and gain-assistance professor) 
there was also less breadth of strategy endorsement. In contrast, for those situations 
where there was a high degree of familiarity and a well-established relationship 
(i.e., obligation, third party, annoyance, advice parent, assistance parent, routine 
activity friends, and relational escalation) there was a corresponding increase in 
strategic flexibility. Possibly, individuals felt less constrained in situations with 
individuals that were mure familiar.
As support for the flexibility hypothesis, a significant main effect was found 
for DF-, F (l, 103) = 5.06, p < .05. As predicted, high discriminators were willing to 
consider using a broader range of tactics (M = 4.75, SD = .74) when compared to low 
discriminators (M = 4.37, SD = .92). The absence of a DF- by scenario interaction 
clearly indicates that the flexibility displayed by high DF- individuals is not limited to 
particular situations.
To examine whether high DF- participants actually preferred to use more 
strategies, rather than were just willing to consider more strategies, a more stringent 
criterion was applied to the strategy counts. A count of the number of strategies with a 
rating of 3 or less from the I to 7 scales was performed. Again a 2 (DF-; High/Low) X 
14 (Scenario) repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the total counts of 
strategies preferred for each scenario. Although the means were in the predicted 
direction with the high DF- endorsing more (M = 3.91, SD = .83) than the low DF-
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(M = 3.66, SD = .96) participants; neither the main effect for DF-, F (l, 103) = 1.94,
P = .17, nor the interaction, F( 13, 1339) = 1.09, p =  .36 was significant. A scenario 
main effect was found to be significant, F(13, 1339) = 23.25, p  < .001. However, the 
general trend of increased strategic flexibility in closer relationships was similar to that 
found in the preceding analyses; therefore, this effect is not discussed further.
Although high DF- participants indicated a broader consideration of techniques 
across situations, they did not indicate a strong preference to use a broader range of 
tactics when compared to low DF- individuals. The open-mindedness of high DF- 
individuals is evident; however, what high DF- individuals would actuallv do in 
practice is less clear. The current studies were not designed to tease apart the 
implications of strategy consideration versus strategy preference; however, future 
research could explore this issue.
Study 2 Discussion
These results provide additional support for the role of discriminative facility 
as a facet of social intelligence. However, the positive relationship between 
discriminative facility and social interaction quality was found to be limited to 
negative behaviors (DF-). That is, in response to negative behavior it would be socially 
smart to recognize the impact of the situation when making attributions about a 
person’s behavior. Further, blaming a person in a negative situation was related to 
poorer social interaction quality. Interestingly, these results somewhat limit the benefit 
of discriminative facility. Thus, previous conclusions of Chiu et al. (1995) where 
discriminative facility was reported as being generally beneficial for social interactions
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should be modified to pertain to only interpretations of negative behavior (DF-). The 
failure to use discriminative facility for positive behaviors (i.e., giving credit to a 
person for a good deed rather than attributing it to the situation) was not related to 
higher social interaction quality as predicted. However, the more extreme hypothesis 
(that DF+ would actually harm relationships) was not supported.
Another interesting feature associated with discriminative facility is strategic 
flexibility. Not surprisingly, individuals high in discriminative facility (DF-) reported a 
broader base of persuasion tactics in many situations. However, it is not the case that 
high discriminators (DF-) simply relied on any particular strategy across situations. 
They appear to be sensitive to certain features of the situation that prompt an 
endorsement of a broader array of tactics in some situations while not in others. For 
example, when advising a friend, asking their landlord to fix their plumbing, asking 
their partner to meet their family, or trying to discourage a friend’s drinking a wide 
variety of tactics were considered. However, when confronted with an annoying 
neighbor, they elected to rely on direct request more than nondiscriminators. These 
results provide evidence for the role of discriminative facility as an aspect of social 
intelligence that impacts social influence. Discriminantly encoding information is 
associated with discriminantly responding in various situations.
General Conclusion 
The results of these studies provided support for the importance of being 
sensitive to situational nuances (i.e., discriminative facility), especially when 
interpreting others’ negative behavior (DF-). This unique component of social
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intelligence is important to the understanding of others and was found to contribute to 
the managing of others. Study 1 examined the distinction between two constructs 
reported to encompass situational sensitivity (i.e., self-monitoring and discriminative 
facility). They were found to tap unique aspects of situational awareness. Additionally, 
a more readily scored Likert approach was successful in measuring discriminative 
facility in both positive and negative situations, compared to the burdensome 
summarization and coding approach used by Chiu et al. (1995).
Study 2 replicated previous findings (e.g., Chiu et al., 1995; Shoda, Mischel, & 
Wright, 1989) and established boundary conditions for discriminative facility. 
Previously, Chiu et al. (1995) had argued for the general benefits of discriminative 
facility. In particular, relying on discriminative facility was found to be associated with 
higher social interaction quality. However, their research was limited to negative 
situations (DF-). It is understandable that in the cases of negative behaviors, 
recognizing the context (i.e., giving an actor the benefit of the doubt) instead of 
blaming individuals would have positive interpersonal consequences. Indeed in the 
present study, being sensitive to the context was found to contribute to positive 
interpersonal relations. However, this finding was found to be limited to negative 
behaviors (DF-). The failure to use discriminative facility for positive behaviors (i.e., 
giving credit to a person for a good deed rather than attributing it to the situation) was 
not related to higher social interaction quality as suspected.
The robust finding that discriminating in moderately negative situations (DF-) 
leads to positive social consequences is consistent with previous research that has
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highlighted the impact of negative information (Fiske, 1980; Hamilton & Zanna, 1972; 
Ostrom & Davis, 1979). Negative information and extreme information have been 
proposed as eliciting more attention than moderate information and positive 
information (Fiske, 1980). The goal of the present studies was to create moderately 
positive and moderately negative situations so that variability in discriminative facility 
(DF- and DF-h) could be assessed. Moderatelv negative behavior may be sufficient to 
elicit DF- social consequences. Future research could examine the consequence of 
discriminative facility in response to more extreme positive behavior (DF+). It is 
possible that the suspected negative repercussions of discriminating in response to 
extremelv positive behavior (i.e., dismissing positive behavior by emphasizing the 
situation) would surface.
The potential significance of discriminative facility in positive situations (DF4-) 
is suggested by the close relationship literature (Fincham & Bradbury, 1989; Jacobson, 
McDonald, Follette, & Berley, 1985). Jacobson, McDonald, Follette, and Berley, 
(1985) found that when nondistressed couples made attributions of their partner’s 
behavior in positive situations, they credited their partner (i.e., did not rely on 
discriminative facility). Still, their results were consistent with the present study when 
they examined distressed couples. In this circumstance, Jacobson, McDonald, Follette, 
and Berley, (1985) found distressed couples made internal attributions (i.e., did not 
rely on discriminative facility) for their partner’s negative behavior. Hence, the lack of 
discriminative facility with respect to negative behavior was associated with poorer 
social interaction quality.
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In study 2, individuals high in disciiminative facility (DF-) reported a broader 
repertoire of social influence strategies. As mentioned, high self-monitoring has also 
been linked to a broader array of persuasion tactics (Bell & Daly, 1984;
Caldwell & Burger, 1997). Although self-monitoring and discriminative facility were 
found to differ from each other in study I, arguably they both encompass different 
aspects of sensitivity to differences in situations. Therefore, it was reasonable to 
expect that sensitivity to situational variations allows for flexibility in approach.
Jones and Day (1997) found that adolescents rated as socially competent displayed 
greater social-cognitive flexibility (i.e., the capacity to apply social knowledge to 
novel situations). Shoda et al. (1993) found that socially competent children 
discriminantly responded across situations. Conger, Conger, and Cowan (1991) found 
that socially incompetent males that had reported difficulties in heterosocial 
interactions evidenced less variability in their social judgments. Conger et al. (1991) 
posited that this might have reflected an inability to discriminate among social 
information when compared to socially competent individuals. Therefore, the capacity 
to discriminate flexibly among social stimuli and to be sensitive to situational changes 
(i.e., discriminative facility) can facilitate success in life tasks (Cantor & Harlow, 
1994). Social intelligence allows individuals to reach their goals and promote positive 
feelings (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1989). Indiscriminant responding, that is failing to 
recognize situational constraints, impedes social goal attainment 
(Cantor & Harlow, 1994). This is consistent with the findings of the two previous 
studies. Individuals who relied on discriminative facility (DF-) reported greater
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success in social interactions. Additionally, they were found to be sensitive to 
differences within various situations, which resulted in a broader array of strategy 
selection.
In general, it is a common assumption that socially intelligent individuals have 
a prosocial orientation and rely on positive social influence tactics to reach their goals 
(e.g.. Ford, 1982; Rubin & Rose-Krasnor, 1992). However, it is interesting to note that 
in the present data, although there was a tendency to use more positive techniques, 
high DF- individuals were at least as willing to consider negative techniques 
(i.e., negative manipulation and coercion) as low DF- individuals. Thus, part of social 
intelligence might include a willingness to consider which tactics are most effective, 
even if that includes less positive techniques when warranted by the situation. As 
defined by Thorndike (1920), social intelligence includes understanding others and 
successfully managing others. Consequently, socially intelligent individuals probably 
try to maximize both of these objectives when possible. However, occasionally they 
may not be able to meet both of these objectives simultaneously and may have to focus 
on goal attainment. Ultimately, this differentiated social-cognitive representation and 
varied repertoire of strategies allows those that rely on discriminative facility 
(DF-) greater flexibility in social situations. Clearly, discriminative facility (DF-) has a 
variety of benefits in terms of social interaction quality and social influence; however, 
the presence or absence of discriminative facility in positive situations (DF-f) does not 
appear to have as great of an impact.
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Footnotes
'in  some instances, participants did not clearly employ one strategy in their 
summaries. In these instances, the passages were coded as “none.”
“Because the levels (high and low) of DF- and DF4- were created based on the 
scale mid-point cut-off criteria, individuals that scored at the mid-point of DF- or DF-t- 
were excluded from the initial analyses. When all factors were included in the model, 
96 participants were analyzed by a nonorthogonal ANOVA (Appelbaum & Cramer, 
1974; O ’Brien, 1976). After removing the nonsignificant interaction term and 
nonsignificant DF4- from the model, 103 participants (N = 42  High DF-; N = 61 Low 
DF-) were analyzed for the DF- main effect alone. Note that participants who scored at 
the mid-point for DF-t- (and therefore were excluded from the previous analyses) were 
included in the DF- analysis.
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Table I
Correlations Between Discriminative Facilitv Coding and the Likert Discriminative 
Facilitv Measure
Praise
Passage Coding Categories 
Dismiss Blame Excuse
Likert Scales
Positive Situation -.43** .40** -.19 .01
Negative Situation .02 .11 -.55** .53**
N = 78; *2 < .05; **£ < .01
Note. Higher scores for the Likert scales represent situational explanations. Higher 
scores for the passage coding categories indicate use of that particular attribution.
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Table 2
Passage Coding Categories
Praise Dismiss Blame Excuse
Self-monitoring -.13 .07 -.14 .01
Other-directed -.23 .15 -.05 -.04
N = 73; None of the rs were statistically significant at g < .05.
Note. The scales for other-directedness and self-monitoring were scored such that 
higher values indicate tendencies toward being other-directed or a high self-monitor, 
respectively. Higher scores for the passage coding categories indicate use of that 
particular attribution.
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Table 3
Correlations Between Self-Monitoring and the Likert Discriminative Facilitv Measure
Likert Scales
Positive Situation Negative Situation
Self-monitoring .09 -.03
Other-directed .17 -.03
N = 73; None of the rs were statistically significant at g < .05.
Note. The scales for other-directedness and self-monitoring were scored such that 
higher values indicate tendencies toward being other-directed or a high self-monitor, 
respectively. Higher scores for the Likert scales represent situational explanations.
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Table 4
Mean Likelihood of Using Strategies in Each of the Scenarios 
bv Levels of Discriminative Facilitv (DF-)
Scenario DF
Strategy 
Ration Ingrat Direct -Man Coer Avoid Ref Comp
Relational
De-escalat
Low
High
2.23
1.89
3.81
3.87
5.50
5.11
5.76
5.76
6.73
6.78
5.23
5.11
3.34
2.56
3.32
3.51
Advice Low 1.63 3.87 5.02 4.94 6.52 5.52 3.10 3.03
Friend High 1.78 3.04 4.51 4.16 6.24 5.18 2.91 2.98
Advice Low 1.37 2.59 4.63 5.21 6.65 5.68 2.38 2.43
Parent High 1.64 2.64 4.22 4.78 6.42 5.11 2.29 2.51
Assistance Low 1.21 2.52 4.75 5.71 6.95 5.49 5.05 2.41
Professor High 1.31 2.51 4.53 4.82 6.71 5.60 4.80 2.51
Annoyance Low 1.71 3.51 4.65 4.71 5.46 5.63 3.81 2.00
High 1.64 3.98 3.58 4.36 4.80 5.71 3.80 2.56
Bureaucracy Low 2.90 2.92 6.02 5.06 6.92 3.68 5.43 4.17
High 2.91 2.93 5.75 4.86 6.86 4.39 5.73 4.23
Assistance Low 1.14 1.90 5.03 4.75 6.79 5.56 2.67 1.79
Parent High 1.44 2.04 4.33 4.44 6.69 5.40 2.33 1.62
Routine Act Low 1.75 2.83 4.06 5.35 6.76 5.67 2.40 2.19
Friend High 2.07 2.67 3.36 4.44 6.40 4.98 2.76 2.49
Obligation Low 1.37 3.27 3.51 4.76 5.06 6.29 4.59 2.94
High 1.44 3.00 2.73 3.76 4.18 6.27 4.04 3.20
Relational Low 1.48 1.92 4.37 4.86 6.44 5.70 1.73 2.11
Escalation High 1.53 1.96 4.11 3.73 5.84 5.67 1.60 1.89
Assistance Low 1.29 2.22 4.60 6.06 6.86 5.32 4.67 2.89
Stranger High 1.51 1.98 3.67 5.76 6.76 5.22 4.93 3.09
Assistance Low 1.97 2.26 4.61 5.85 6.87 4.71 3.69 2.44
Acquaint High 1.76 2.36 4.09 5.58 6.73 5.00 3.69 2.38
Third Party Low 1.32 3.45 4.74 4.47 6.39 6.11 2.55 2.44
High 1.49 3.04 3.93 3.69 6.02 6.02 2.27 2.38
Relational Low 3.98 2.21 4.57 6.49 6.94 3.60 3.87 4.08
Initiation High 4.18 2.07 3.96 6.13 6.87 3.78 3.31 3.47
Note. In order, the strategies are rationalization, ingratiation, direct request, negative 
manipulation, coercion, avoidance, referent appeal, and compromise.
A lower number indicates higher likelihood of use.
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Table 5
Strategv Comparisons within Each Scenario
Scenario Ration Ingrat
Strategy 
Direct -Man Coer Avoid Ref Comp
Relational
De-escalat
2.08a 3.83b 5.34c 5.76c 6.75d 5.18c 3.01b 3.40b
Advice
Friend
1.69a 3.52b 4.80c 4.61c 6.40d 5.37c 3.02b 3.01b
Advice
Parent
1.48a 2.61b 4.46c 5.03c 6.56d 5.44c 2.34b 2.46b
Assistance
Professor
1.25a 2.52b 4.66c 5.34c 6.85d 5.54c 4.94c 2.45b
Annoyance 1.69a 3.70b 4.20b 4.56bc 5.19cd 5.67d 3.81b 2.23a
Bureaucracy 2.91a 2.93a 5.91c 4 .9 8 k 6.90d 3.97ab 5.55c 4.20b
Assistance
Parent
1.27a 1.96bc 4.74d 4.62(1 6.75c 5.49d 2.53c l.72ab
Routine Act 
Friend
1.88a 2.76b 3.77c 4.97(1 6.61c 5.38d 2.55b 2.3 lab
Obligation 1.40a 3.16b 3.19b 4.34c 4.69c 6.28d 4.36c 3.05b
Relational
Escalation
1.50a 1.94ab 4.26c 4.39c 6.19d 5.69d 1.68ab 2.02b
Assistance
Stranger
1.38a 2.12b 4.21(1 5.94f 6.81g 5.28cf 4.78dc 2.97c
Assistance
Acquaint
1.88a 2.30a 4.39bc 5.74(1 6.81c 4.83cd 3.69b 2.41a
Third Party 1.39a 3.28cd 4.40c 4 .14dc 6 .23f 6 .07f 2.43b 2.41 be
Relational
Initiation
4.06b 2.15a 4.31b 6.34c 6.91d 3.68b 3.64b 3.82b
Note. The strategies are rationalization, ingratiation, direct request, negative 
manipulation, coercion, avoidance, referent appeal, and compromise.
Lower numbers reflect a higher likelihood of use. Means within a row that do not
share the same subscript are significantly different at p  < .00013.
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Appendix A
NAME:. 
ID#__
The statements below concern your personal reactions to a number of 
different situations. No two statements are exactly alike, so consider 
each statement carefully before answering. If a statement is TRUE or 
MOSTLY TRUE as applied to you, circle A. If a statement is FALSE or NOT 
USUALLY TRUE as applied to you, circle B.
MOSTLY TRUE = A MOSTLY FALSE = B
T F
(A) (B)
1. A B I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other
people.
2. A B At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to
do o -• say things that others will like.
3. A B I can only argue for ideas for which I already
believe.
4. A B I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about
which I have almost no information.
5. A B I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain
others. *
6. A B I would probably make a good actor.
7. A B In a group of people I am rarely the center of
attention.
8. A B In different situations and with different people, I
often act like very different people. *
9. A B I am not particularly good at making other people like
me.
10. A B I'm not always the person I appear to be. *
11. A B I would not change my opinions (or the way I do
things) in order to please someone or win their favor.
12. A B I have considered being an entertainer.
13. A B I have never been good at games like charades or
improvisational acting.
14. A B I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different
people and different situations.
P L E A S E  T U R N  O V E R
D iscrim inative  F acility  65
T P
(A) (B)
15. A B At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories
going.
16. A B I feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up
quite as well as I should. *
17. A B I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a
straight face (if for a right end).
18. A B I may deceive people by being friendly when I really
dislike them. *
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Appendix B
Negative Situations
B R A D
Brad completed his Masters in Business Administration and ranked in the top ten percent 
of his graduating class. He secured a position at Paxwell Incorporated (a large marketing 
firm). Brad wanted to advance into corporate management. Advancement in the company 
was very competitive. A couple of Brad’s coworkers were also looking to advance in the 
company. Brad worked long hours at his job. On one occasion. Brad knocked his boss’s 
coffee cup to the ground. He picked up the broken pieces and threw them in the dumpster. 
Brad noticed his boss looking for his cup, but said he did not know anything about it. 
Brad’s boss often worked late. One day. Brad’s boss asked him to Join him for golf the 
next day. Although Brad did not care for golf, he told his boss that it was one of his 
favorite sports and that he was looking forward to playing. That evening. Brad purchased 
a set of golf clubs with a well-known brand and other pieces of equipment. Brad knew 
that office politics were important. Brad wondered what people thought of him in the 
office. Brad regularly sent birthday cards to his boss. On occasion, he brought donuts for 
his boss and complimented his appearance. Once, a coworker was on his way to give a 
presentation and noticed a stain on his shirt. He asked Brad to look at his shirt. Brad told 
him that the stain was not noticeable. The next morning Brad was preparing for a 
meeting. A coworker called and stated that he had car trouble. The coworker was 2 blocks 
from work and asked for a ride. Brad told him that he could not help him. Brad suggested 
he try someone else. After working for the firm for five years. Brad received a promotion.
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Negative Situations 
SCOTT
Scott was working to complete his undergraduate degree in computer science. He hoped 
to work in the Internet software industry as a programmer. Many of Scott’s computer 
programming classes involved writing programs that were difficult. Scott enrolled in a 
COBOL class for the summer semester. Scott’s COBOL instructor did not allow students 
to work together on the assignments. Scott worked many late hours on his homework.
He would often arrive early to class. He sat in the front of the room. Scott wanted to make 
an “A” in the class. One day, the instructor informed the class that the next assignment 
would take 1 week to complete. Scott worked for two days on the program. He read 
several COBOL programming books. He was unable to reach a solution. One afternoon, 
Scott asked a fellow student if he had completed the assignment. The student said that he 
had finished the program. Scott asked for a copy of his program. Scott turned in a copy 
of the program a few days later. A week later, Scott took the student to lunch. One day, 
Scott was working in the computer lab on another assignment, and the computer crashed. 
He tried to reboot the computer. A message stating that his disk had corrupted the 
computer with a virus appeared on the screen. Scott quickly left the lab. The lab assistant 
worked for two hours correcting the situation. The hard drive was cleaned and the 
computer booted up properly. Later, Scott was able to retrieve the work he had completed 
earlier. The assignments and examinations continued to be very difficult. Scott worked 
very hard on the assignments. Scott performed well in the course. Scott continued to take 
classes and completed his undergraduate degree.
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Positive Situations
BRAD
Brad completed his Masters in Business Administration and ranked in the top ten percent 
of his graduating class. He secured a position at Paxwell Incorporated (a large marketing 
firm). Brad wanted to advance into corporate management. Advancement in the company 
was very competitive. A couple of Brad’s coworkers were also looking to advance in the 
company. Brad worked long hours at his job. On one occasion. Brad knocked his boss’s 
coffee cup to the ground. He picked up the broken pieces and threw them in the dumpster. 
He brought a new identical cup to work the next day. Brad’s boss often worked late. One 
day, Brad’s boss asked him to join him for golf the next day. Brad told his boss that it was 
one of his favorite sports and that he was looking forward to playing. That evening. Brad 
purchased a set of golf clubs with a well-known brand and other pieces of equipment. 
Brad knew that office politics were important. Brad wondered what people thought of 
him in the office. Brad regularly sent birthday cards to his coworkers. On occasion, he 
brought donuts for his boss and complimented his appearance. Once, a coworker was on 
his way to give a presentation and noticed a stain on his shirt. He asked Brad to look at 
his shirt. Brad told him that the stain was not noticeable. The next morning Brad was 
preparing for a meeting. A coworker called and stated that he had car trouble. The 
coworker was 2 blocks from work and asked for a ride. Brad told him that he could give 
him a lift. Brad left a few minutes later and gave him a ride. After working for the firm 
for five years. Brad received a promotion.
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Positive Situations 
SCOTT
Scott was working to complete his undergraduate degree in computer science. He hoped 
to work in the Internet software industry as a programmer. Many of Scott’s computer 
programming classes involved writing programs that were difficult. Scott enrolled in a 
COBOL class for the summer semester. Scott’s COBOL instructor did not allow students 
to work together on the assignments. Scott worked many late hours on his homework.
He would often arrive early to class. He sat in the front of the room. Scott wanted to make 
an “A” in the class. One day, the instructor informed the class that the next assignment 
would take I week to complete. Scott worked for two weeks on the program. He read 
several COBOL programming books. He was unable to reach a solution. One afternoon. 
Scott asked a fellow student if he had completed the assignment. The student said that he 
had finished the program. Scott asked him for a few hints. Scott finished the program a 
few days later. A week later, Scott took the student to lunch. One day, Scott was working 
in the computer lab on another assignment, and the computer crashed. He tried to reboot 
the computer. A message stating that his disk had corrupted the computer with a virus 
appeared on the screen. He alerted the lab assistant of the problem and the message. They 
worked together for two hours correcting the situation. The hard drive was cleaned and 
the computer booted up properly. Scott was able to retrieve the work he had completed 
earlier. The assignments and examinations continued to be very difficult. Scott worked 
very hard on the assignments. Scott performed well in the course. Scott continued to take 
classes and completed his undergraduate degree
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Brad N eg a tiv e  Item s
Appendix C
*1. T h e  m a in  r ea so n  b e h in d  B rad ly in g  to  h is  b o s s  w a s
1
H e  is that k ind  
o f  p erso n
so m e th in g  a b o u t  
th e  s itu a tio n
* 2 . T h e  m a in  r e a so n  b e h in d  B rad not g iv in g  a rid e to h is  c o w o rk er  w a s
1 2 
H e  is that k ind  
o f  p erso n
6  7
so m e th in g  ab ou t  
th e  s itu a tio n
3. T h e  m ain  rea so n  b eh in d  B rad  b e in g  n ic e  to p e o p le  w a s
1 2 
H e  is that k ind  
o f  p erson
6  7
so m e th in g  ab ou t  
th e  s itu a tio n
* 4 . D o  y o u  th in k  that B rad  w o u ld  h a v e  in fo r m ed  s o m e o n e  o th e r  than h is  b o ss  that h e  b ro k e  th e ir  c o f f e e  
cu p ?
1 2  3
n ev er
6  7
a lw a y s
* 5 . D o  y o u  th in k  that B rad  w o u ld  g iv e  a p erso n  a r id e i f  h e w ere  n o t at w o rk  ?
I
n ev er
7
a lw a y s
6 . B r a d ’s  b e h a v io r  is
I 2 
H ig h ly  c o n s is te n t  
( fr e e  o f  s itu a tio n a l  
in f lu e n c e )
6  7
V a r ia b le  d e p e n d in g  
o n  th e  situ a tio n
* Item s u se d  in  the d isc r im in a tiv e  fa c il ity  L ik ert sc a le .
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Brad P o sit iv e  Item s
*1. T h e m ain reason behind Brad buying his boss a rep lacem ent c o ffe e  cup was
I 2 
H e  is  that k ind  
o f  p erso n
so m e th in g  ab ou t 
th e  s itu a tio n
2 . T h e  m a in  r ea so n  b eh in d  B rad  g iv in g  a  r id e to  h is  c o w o r k e r  w a s
1 2 3 4  5
H e  is  that k ind  
o f  p erso n
♦ 3 . T h e  m a in  r ea so n  b eh in d  B rad b e in g  n ic e  to  p e o p le  w a s
6  7
so m e th in g  ab o u t  
th e  situ a tio n
1 2  3
H e  is that k ind  
o f  p erso n
6  7
so m e th in g  a b o u t  
the s itu a tio n
4 . D o  y o u  th in k  that B rad  w o u ld  h a v e  in fo r m ed  s o m e o n e  o th er  than  h is  b o ss  that h e  b rok e their  c o f fe e  cu p ?
1 2 
n ev er
6  7
a lw a y s
* 5 . D o  y o u  th in k  that B rad  w o u ld  g iv e  a p erso n  a  rid e i f  h e w ere  n o t at w ork ?
1 2 3
n ev er
7
a lw a y s
* 6 . B r a d ’s  b e h a v io r  is
1 2  3
H ig h ly  c o n s is te n t  
( fr e e  o f  s itu a tio n a l 
in flu e n c e )
V a r ia b le  d e p e n d in g  
o n  the  situ a tio n
♦ Item s u se d  in th e  d isc r im in a tiv e  fa c ility  L ik ert s c a le .
Scott N eg a tiv e  Item s
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* I . T h e  m ain reason behind Scott cheating on the hom ew ork w as
I 2  3
H e  is that k in d  
o f  p erso n
6  7
so m e th in g  a b o u t  
th e  situ a tio n
*2. T h e  m a in  rea so n  b eh in d  S c o tt  le a v in g  the  lab  w ith o u t te llin g  the lab  a ss is ta n t  o f  the  p ro b lem  w a s
1 2  3
H e  is  that k ind  
o f  p erso n
3. T h e  m ain  r e a so n  b eh in d  S c o t t  w o r k in g  hard
I 2  3
H e  is  that k in d  
o f  p erso n
6  7
so m e th in g  ab o u t  
th e  situ a tio n
6  7
so m e th in g  ab ou t  
th e  s itu a tio n
* 4 .D o  y o u  th in k  that S c o tt  w o u ld  c h e a t  in o th er  c la s s e s ?
1 2 
n ev er
7
a lw a y s
*5 . D o  y o u  th in k  that S c o tt  w o u ld  h e lp  so m e o n e  i f  a sk ed ?
n e v e r
7
a lw a y s
6 . S c o t t ’s b e h a v io r  is
I 2  
H ig h ly  c o n s is te n t  
(fr e e  o f  s itu a tio n a l 
in flu e n c e )
6  7
V a r ia b le  d e p e n d in g  
o n  th e  s itu a tio n
* Item s u se d  in th e  d isc r im in a tiv e  fa c ility  L ik ert sc a le .
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S co tt P o sitiv e  Item s
* I . T h e m ain reason behind Scott help ing the lab assistant with the com puter problem  was
1 2 
H e  is  that k ind  
o f  p e r so n
6  7
so m e th in g  ab o u t  
the s itu a tio n
2 . T h e  m a in  r ea so n  b eh in d  S c o tt  a sk in g  for h e lp
1
H e is that k in d  
o f  p erso n
6  7
so m e th in g  a b o u t  
the  s itu a tio n
*3 . T h e  m ain  r ea so n  b eh in d  S c o tt  w o rk in g  hard w a s
1
H e  is  that k ind  
o f  p erso n
6  7
so m e th in g  a b o u t  
the s itu a tio n
4 . D o  y o u  th in k  that S c o tt  w o u ld  w o rk  hard in  o th e r  classes'?
1 2 
n e v e r
7
a lw a y s
* 5 . D o  y o u  th in k  that S c o tt  w o u ld  h e lp  s o m e o n e  i f  a sk ed  ?
1 2 
n e v e r
7
a lw a y s
* 6 . S c o t t 's  b e h a v io r  is
H ig h ly  c o n s is te n t  
( fr e e  o f  s itu a tio n a l  
in flu e n c e )
6  7
V a r ia b le  d e p e n d in g  
o n  the s itu a tio n
"Item s u se d  in the d isc r im in a tiv e  fa c ility  L ik ert s c a le .
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Appendix D 
Impression Ratings
Use the following scale to respond to items below.
1 2 3
not at all moderately extremely
1. How friendly does Brad appear to you?
2. How likable does Brad appear to you?
3. Do you believe Brad cared about others?
4. Do you believe Brad worked hard?
P la c e  an  " x” in th e  b o x  that rep resen ts y o u r  ju d g m e n t  a b o u t  BRAD.
B A D
7
G O O D
P la c e  an  “ x" in the  b o x  that rep resen ts y o u r  ju d g m e n t  a b o u t BRAD.
1
N E G A T I V E P O S IT IV E
1. How friendly does Scott appear to you?
2. How likable does Scott appear to you?
3. Do you believe Scott cared about others?
4. Do you believe Scott worked hard?
P la c e  an ' .x" in  th e  b o x  that rep resen ts y o u r  ju d g m e n t a b o u t  S C O T T .
1 2  3 4  5 6  7
B A D G O O D
P la c e  an  "x" in  the  b o x  that rep resen ts y o u r  ju d g m e n t  a b o u t S C O T T .
1 2  3 4  5 6  7
N E G A T IV E P O S IT IV E
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Appendix E 
Quality o f Social Interactions
I. P le a se  ta k e  a  m o m en t a n d  reca ll th e  m o st  rece n t in sta n c e  in  w h ich  y o u  in te ra cte d  w ith  your professor 
a lo n e  an d  fa c e - to - fa c e  fo r  m o re  than  15 m in u tes.
D o  y o u  fe e l  that y o u  a tta in ed  you r  
p erso n a l g o a l in the in te ra c tio n ?
"no" " to so m e  e x te n t”  " y e s” 
1 2  3
A fter  th e  in tera ctio n ,
rate the q u a lity  o f  you r  r e la t io n sh ip . "got w o r se  
1
" rem ain ed  the  sam e"  
o
" g o t b etter” 
3
2 . P le a se  ta k e  a m o m en t an d  reca ll the m o st recen t in sta n c e  in w h ich  y o u  in tera cted  w ith  vour parent a lo n e  
an d  fa c e - to - fa c e  for m o re  than  15 m in u tes .
"no “to  so m e  e x ten t
D o  y o u  fe e l  that y o u  a tta in ed  y ou r  
p erso n a l g o a l in the  in te ra c tio n  ?
" y e s”
3
A fter  the  in tera ctio n .
rate th e  q u a lity  o f  y o u r  r e la t io n sh ip . “g o t w o r se ”  " rem ain ed  the  sa m e ” " g o t b etter” 
1 2  3
3. P le a se  take a m o m en t an d  reca ll the m o st recen t in sta n ce  in  w h ic h  y o u  in tera cted  w ith  a close friend 
a lo n e  and fa c e - to - fa c e  for m o re  than  15 m in u tes.
D o  y o u  fe e l that y o u  a tta in ed  y ou r  
p erso n a l g o a l in the in te ra c tio n ?
"n o” "to so m e  e x ten t"  " y e s” 
1 2 3
A fter  the  in te ra ctio n .
rate the  q u a lity  o f  y o u r  r e la t io n sh ip . “ g o t w o r se ” " rem a in ed  the sa m e ” " got b etter”
1 2  3
4. P le a se  ta k e  a m o m en t an d  reca ll th e  m o st recen t in sta n ce  in  w h ich  y o u  in tera cted  w ith  a person you 
dislike a lo n e  and fa c e - to - fa c e  for  m o re  than 15 m in u tes.
“n o ” " to s o m e  e x te n t”
D o  y o u  fe e l that y o u  a tta in ed  y o u r  
p e r so n a l g o a l in the in te ra c tio n ?
■yes
3
A fte r  th e  in tera ctio n .
rate the  q u a lity  o f  y ou r r e la t io n sh ip . "got w o r se  
1
" rem ain ed  th e  sa m e ” 
?
" g o t better"  
3
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Appendix F
Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use
each of the following strategies for the given situation.
Routine Activities-Friends
P le a se  im a g in e  th e  fo l lo w in g  situ a tion ; You want to  have a routine night out with you r friends.
E x a m p le :  Y o u  an d  y o u r  fr ien d s h a v e n ’t g o n e  o u t fo r  a n igh t o n  the to w n  in  s o m e  tim e  and  y o u  
w an t to  p ersu a d e  th e m  in to  g o in g  w ith  y o u  th is F rid ay  e v e n in g .
Strongly Strongly
agree disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 Without going into details. I'd  simply ask, ‘Can you do it?’ I wouldn’t
feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. [Direct 
Request)
_________ I’d put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to
persuade him/her. I’d get him/her in the right ‘frame of mind’ before asking. 
(Positive Manipidation o f  Feelings)
_________I would suggest that we talk over some compromise, and work
something out. {Compromise)
_________ I would show how disappointed I was in him/her. I’d act sad, hurt,
and/or dejected when trying to influence him/her to make them feel guilty, etc. 
(Negative Manipidation o f  Feelings)
_________ I would fully explain to them the reasons why I wanted the person(s) to
agree with my request. (Rationality)
_________ I would threaten to punish the person(s) if he/she/they did not go along
with my request. (Coercion)
I would appeal to the person(s) by referring to the nature of our
relationship and our sense of togetherness and mutual liking. (Referent Appeal) 
________ I probably wouldn’t do anything about persuading the person(s) in this
situation. I’d drop the matter and just hope that the person(s) would come around.
(Avoidance).
D iscr im in ative  F a cility  77
Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use
each of the following strategies for the given situation.
Bureaucracy
P le a se  im a g in e  th e  fo l lo w in g  s itu a tio n : You w ant to persuade a person in au thority o r  in a 
bu reaucracy to do  som ething.
E x a m p le :  O n  a  r ece n t trip b a ck  to  s c h o o l  from  v a c a t io n , y o u  are g o in g  " about"  6 0  m ph  w h e n  y o u  
are s to p p e d  b y  a  p o l ic e  o f f ic e r  for s p e e d in g . Y o u  w an t to  p ersu a d e  the o f f ic e r  n o t to  g iv e  y o u  a 
tick et.
Strongly Strongly
agree disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Without going into details, I’d simply ask, ‘Can you do it?’ I wouldn’t
feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. {Direct 
Request)
_________ I’d put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to
persuade him/her. I’d get him/her in the right ‘frame of mind’ before asking. 
{Positive Manipulation o f  Feelings)
_________I would suggest that we talk over some compromise, and work
something out. {Compromise)
_________ I would show how disappointed I was in him/her. I’d act sad, hurt,
and/or dejected when trying to influence him/her to make them feel guilty, etc. 
{Negative Manipulation o f  Feelings)
_________ I would fully explain to them the reasons why I wanted the person(s) to
agree with my request. {Rationality}
_________ I would threaten to punish the person(s) if he/she/they did not go along
with my request. {Coercion)
I would appeal to the person(s) by referring to the nature of our
relationship and our sense of togetherness and mutual liking. {Referent Appeal) 
 I probably wouldn’t do anything about persuading the person(s) in this
situation. I’d drop the matter and just hope that the person(s) would come around.
{Avoidance).
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Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use
each of the following strategies for the given situation.
Advice Giving-Friend
P lease  im agine the fo llow in g  situation: Y o u  a re  g iv in g  a d v ic e  to  s o m e o n e  a b o u t w h o m  y o u  care .
E x a m p le :  A  c lo s e  fr ien d  o f  y o u rs  at c o l l e g e  h a s b een  sp e n d in g  a  g o o d  d e a l o f  tim e on  h is /h er  
n o n a c a d e m ic  a c t iv it ie s  and h a s n e g le c te d  h is /h e r  g ra d es . Y o u  w an t to p e r su a d e  h im /h er  to  stu d y  
m o r e  an d  g e n e r a l ly  sp e a k in g , to  se t  s o m e  c a r e e r  g o a ls .
Strongly Strongly
agree disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 W ithout going into details, I’d simply ask, ‘Can you do it?’ I wouldn’t
feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. {Direct 
Request)
_________ I’d put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to
persuade him/her. I’d get him/her in the right ‘frame of mind’ before asking. 
{Positive Manipulation o f  Feelings)
_________I would suggest that we talk over some compromise, and work
something out. {Compromise)
 I would show how disappointed I was in him/her. I’d act sad, hurt,
and/or dejected when trying to influence him/her to make them feel guilty, etc. 
{Negative Manipulation o f Feelings)
_________ I would fully explain to them the reasons why I wanted the person(s) to
agree with my request. {Rationality)
_________ I would threaten to punish the person(s) if he/she/they did not go along
with my request. {Coercion)
I would appeal to the person(s) by referring to the nature of our
relationship and our sense of togetherness and mutual liking. {Referent Appeal) 
 I probably wouldn’t do anything about persuading the person(s) in this
situation. I’d drop the matter and just hope that the person(s) would come around.
{Avoidance).
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Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use
each of the following strategies for the given situation.
Relational De-escalation
P le a se  im a g in e  the  fo l lo w in g  s itu a tio n : You want to break o ff  a dating rela tionsh ip  with a person  
that you h ave d a ted  f o r  a  fe w  months.
E x a m p le: W h ile  y o u  first l ik e d  the d a tin g  a p articu lar p erso n , y o u  n o w  r e a liz e  that th e  tw o  o f  y o u  
rea lly  d o  n o t h a v e  a  lo t  in  c o m m o n . Y o u  w an t to  p ersu a d e  h im /h er  that y o u  o n ly  w a n t to  b e  fr ien d s, 
n o th in g  m o re .
Strongly Strongly
agree disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Without going into details, I’d simply ask, ‘Can you do it?’ I wouldn’t
feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. {Direct 
Request)
_________ I’d put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to
persuade him/her. I’d get him/her in the right ‘frame of mind’ before asking. 
{Positive Manipulation o f  Feelings)
_________I would suggest that we talk over some compromise, and work
something out. {Compromise)
_________ I would show how disappointed I was in him/her. I’d act sad, hurt,
and/or dejected when trying to influence him/her to make them feel guilty, etc. 
{Negative Manipulation o f Feelings)
_________ I would fully explain to them the reasons why I wanted the person(s) to
agree with my request. {Rationality)
 I would threaten to punish the person(s) if he/she/they did not go along
with my request. {Coercion)
I would appeal to the person(s) by referring to the nature of our
relationship and our sense of togetherness and mutual liking. {Referent Appeal) 
________ I probably wouldn’t do anything about persuading the person(s) in this
situation. I’d drop the matter and just hope that the person(s) would come around.
{Avoidance).
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Please use the following scale to Indicate the likelihood that you would use
each of the following strategies for the given situation.
Assistance-Acquaintance
P le a se  im a g in e  th e  fo l lo w in g  situ a tio n : You w ant to  persu ade an acquaintance to  help you  do  
som ething.
E x a m p le :  Y o u  fin d  that the  m ath  h o m e w o r k  y o u  n eed  to  h a v e  fo r  c la s s  e a c h  p e r io d  a b so r b s  a g o o d  
d e a l o f  y o u r  t im e — tim e  that y o u  rea lly  d o  n o t h a v e  s in c e  y o u  started  w o r k in g  th ree  d a y s  a  w e e k . 
Y o u  w an t to  p e r su a d e  so m e o n e  y o u  k n o w  in  c la s s  to  h e lp  y o u  w ith  the  h o m e w o r k .
Strongly Strongly
agree disagree
"1 2 3 4  5 6  7
 Without going into details. I’d simply ask, ‘Can you do it?’ I wouldn’t
feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. {Direct 
Request)
_________ I’d put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to
persuade him/her. I’d get him/her in the right ‘frame of mind’ before asking. 
{Positive Manipulation o f  Feelings)
_________I would suggest that we talk over some compromise, and work
something out. {Compromise)
 I would show how disappointed I was in him/her. I’d act sad, hurt,
and/or dejected when trying to influence him/her to make them feel guilty, etc. 
{Negative Maitipulation o f  Feelings)
 I would fully e.xplain to them the reasons why I wanted the person(s) to
agree with my request. {Rationality)
_________ I would threaten to punish the person(s) if he/she/they did not go along
with my request. {Coercion)
I would appeal to the person(s) by referring to the nature of our
relationship and our sense of togetherness and mutual liking. {Referent Appeal) 
 I probably wouldn’t do anything about persuading the person(s) in this
situation. I’d drop the matter and Just hope that the person(s) would come around.
{Avoidance).
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Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use
each of the following strategies for the given situation.
Obligation
P le a se  im a g in e  the fo l lo w in g  situ a tion : You want to persu ade a person  to  fu lfill h is/her obligation  
to  you.
E x a m p le :  Y o u  h a v e  l iv e d  in  y o u r  ap artm en t c o m p le x  fo r  so m e  m o n th s. O n e  S a tu rd a y  e v e n in g  y o u  
w a k e  up la te  an d  fin d  the k itc h e n  p lu m b in g  d r ip p in g  v e r y  b a d ly . Y o u  w a n t to  p e r su a d e  the lan d lord  
to  f ix  th e  p lu m b in g  p ro m p tly .
Strongly Strongly
agree disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 Without going into details, I’d simply ask, ‘Can you do it?’ I wouldn’t
feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. (Direct 
Request)
_________ I’d put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to
persuade him/her. I’d get him/her in the right ‘frame of mind’ before asking. 
(Positive Manipulation o f Feelings)
_________I would suggest that we talk over some compromise, and work
something out. (Compromise)
 I would show how disappointed I was in him/her. I’d act sad, hurt,
and/or dejected when trying to influence him/her to make them feel guilty, etc. 
(Negative Manipulation o f  Feelings)
 I would fully explain to them the reasons why I wanted the person(s) to
agree with my request. (Rationality)
_________ I would threaten to punish the person(s) if he/she/they did not go along
with my request. (Coercion)
I would appeal to the person(s) by referring to the nature of our
relationship and our sense of togetherness and mutual liking. (Referent Appeal) 
 I probably wouldn’t do anything about persuading the person(s) in this
situation. I’d drop the matter and just hope that the person(s) would come around.
(Avoidance).
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Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use
each of the following strategies for the given situation.
Relational Initiations
P le a s e  im a g in e  the  fo l lo w in g  situ a tio n : You want to in itiate a  relationship with a person  o f  the 
opposite  sex  o r  to increase the intim acy in a relationship.
E x a m p le :  T h e r e  is a p erso n  o f  the o p p o s it e  s e x  in y ou r M a ss  C o m m u n ic a t io n  c la s s  w h o m  y o u  
w o u ld  lik e  to  k n o w  b etter . Y o u  run in to  h im /h e r  a fter c la s s  and start a c o n v e r s a tio n . Y o u  w an t to  
p e r su a d e  h im /h e r  to  g e t  to g e th e r  a g a in  an d  g e t  to  k n o w  e a c h  other.
Strongly Strongly
agree disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Without going into details. I’d simply ask, ‘Can you do it?’ I wouldn’t
feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. (Direct 
Request)
_________ I’d put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to
persuade him/her. I’d get him/her in the right ‘frame of mind’ before asking. 
{Positive Manipulation o f  Feelings)
_________I would suggest that we talk over some compromise, and work
something out. (Compromise)
_________ I would show how disappointed I was in him/her. I’d act sad, hurt,
and/or dejected when trying to influence him/her to make them feel guilty, etc. 
(Negative Manipulation o f  Feelings)
_________ I would fully explain to them the reasons why I wanted the person(s) to
agree with my request. (Rationality)
_________ I would threaten to punish the person(s) if he/she/they did not go along
with my request. (Coercion)
, I would appeal to the person(s) by referring to the nature of our
relationship and our sense of togetherness and mutual liking. (Referent Appeal) 
________ I probably wouldn’t do anything about persuading the person(s) in this
situation. I’d drop the matter and just hope that the person(s) would com e around.
(Avoidance).
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Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use
each of the following strategies for the given situation.
Gain Assistance-Professor
P le a s e  im a g in e  the f o l lo w in g  situ a tion : You want a pro fessor to  do  you  a  spec ia l favor.
E x a m p le :  Y o u  fin d  that o n e  o f  the c la s se s  y o u  d e sp e r a te ly  n e e d  to  e n r o ll in h as b e e n  c lo s e d  out. 
Y o u  w a n t to  p ersu a d e  the  p r o fe sso r  in to  le ttin g  y o u  e n r o ll  in  th is  c la s s .
Strongly Strongly
agree disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 Without going into details, I’d simply ask, ‘Can you do it?’ I wouldn’t
feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. (Direct 
Request)
_________ I’d put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to
persuade him/her. I’d get him/her in the right ‘frame of mind’ before asking. 
(Positive Manipulation o f  Feelings)
_________I would suggest that we talk over some compromise, and work
something out. (Compromise)
_________ I would show how disappointed I was in him/her. I’d act sad, hurt,
and/or dejected when trying to influence him/her to make them feel guilty, etc. 
(Negative Manipulation o f  Feelings)
_________ I would fully explain to them the reasons why I wanted the person(s) to
agree with my request. (Rationality)
_________ I would threaten to punish the person(s) if he/she/they did not go along
with my request. (Coercion)
I would appeal to the person(s) by referring to the nature of our
relationship and our sense of togetherness and mutual liking. (Referent Appeal) 
 I probably wouldn’t do anything about persuading the person(s) in this
situation. I’d drop the matter and just hope that the person(s) would come around.
(Avoidance).
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Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use
each of the following strategies for the given situation.
Third Person
P le a s e  im a g in e  the  fo l lo w in g  s itu a tio n : You want to persu ade an acquaintance to help  a third  
parry.
E x a m p le : Y o u  b e l ie v e  that a fr ien d  o f  y o u rs is  d r in k in g  (a lc o h o lic  b e v e r a g e s )  to o  m u c h  and y o u  
a lso  b e l ie v e  that the d r in k in g  p r o b le m  h as b e c o m e  q u ite  apparent to  m a n y  p e o p le  o v e r  the  last 
se v e r a l w e e k s . Y o u  w an t to  p ersu a d e  th is  p e r s o n 's  c lo s e s t  frien d  to  ta lk  a b o u t th e  p r o b le m  w ith  
h im /h er  that h e /sh e  m ig h t s to p  d r in k in g .
Strongly Strongly
agree disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 Without going into details, I’d simply ask, ‘Can you do it?’ I wouldn’t
feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. (Direct 
Request)
_________ I’d put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to
persuade him/her. I’d get him/her in the right ‘frame of mind’ before asking. 
(Positive Manipulation o f  Feelings)
_________I would suggest that we talk over some compromise, and work
something out. (Compromise)
 I would show how disappointed I was in him/her. I’d act sad, hurt,
and/or dejected when trying to influence him/her to make them feel guilty, etc. 
(Negative Manipulation o f  Feelings)
_________ I would fully explain to them the reasons why I wanted the person(s) to
agree with my request. (Rationality)
_________ I would threaten to punish the person(s) if he/she/they did not go along
with my request. (Coercion)
I would appeal to the person(s) by referring to the nature of our
relationship and our sense of togetherness and mutual liking. (Referent Appeal) 
 I probably wouldn’t do anything about persuading the person(s) in this
situation. I’d drop the matter and just hope that the person(s) would come around.
(Avoidance).
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Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use
each of the following strategies for the given situation.
Advice Giving-Parents
P le a se  im a g in e  th e  fo l lo w in g  situ a tio n : You want to g ive  adv ice  to  yo u r paren ts abou t som e long­
term g o a l o f  theirs.
E x a m p le :  O n  a  v is it  h o m e  rece n tly  y o u  s e e  that y ou r fa th er lo o k s  tired  and o v e r w o r k e d . Y o u  w ant 
to p e r su a d e  h im  to  ta k e  o f f  from  w o rk  and find  so m e th in g  r e la x in g  to  d o .
Strongly Strongly
agree disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 Without going into details. I’d simply ask, ‘Can you do it?’ I wouldn’t
feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. {Direct 
Request)
_________ I’d put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to
persuade him/her. I’d get him/her in the right ‘frame of mind’ before asking. 
(Positive Manipulation o f  Feelings)
_________I would suggest that we talk over some compromise, and work
something out. (Compromise)
_________ I would show how disappointed I was in him/her. I’d act sad, hurt,
and/or dejected when trying to influence him/her to make them feel guilty, etc. 
(Negative Manipidation o f  Feelings)
 I would fully explain to them the reasons why I wanted the person(s) to
agree with my request. (Rationality)
_________ I would threaten to punish the person(s) if he/she/they did not go along
with my request. (Coercion)
I would appeal to the person(s) by referring to the nature of our
relationship and our sense of togetherness and mutual liking. (Referent Appeal) 
 I probably wouldn’t do anything about persuading the person(s) in this
situation. I’d drop the matter and just hope that the person(s) would come around.
(Avoidance).
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Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use
each of the following strategies for the given situation.
Relational Escalation
P le a se  im a g in e  th e  fo l lo w in g  s itu a tio n : You w ant to include som eone spec ia l to you into you r  
soc ia l w orld  by including him /her in activ ities with you r fr ien ds an d  fam ily.
E x a m p le : Y o u  h a v e  d a ted  y o u r  b o y fr ie n d /g ir lfr ie n d  for s o m e  tim e  and the tw o  o f  y o u  r e a lly  g e t  
a lo n g  w e ll. Y o u  w a n t to  p er su a d e  h im /h er  in to  c o m in g  h o m e fo r  the  w e e k e n d  to  m e e t  y o u r  
r e la tiv e s .
Strongly Strongly
agree disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
, Without going into details. I’d s i m p l y  ask, ‘Can you do it?’ I wouldn’t
feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. (Direct 
Request)
_________ I’d put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to
persuade him/her. I’d get him/her in the right ‘frame of mind’ before asking. 
(Positive Manipulation o f  Feelings)
_________I would suggest that we talk over some compromise, and work
something out. (Compromise)
_________ I would show how disappointed I was in him/her. I’d act sad, hurt,
and/or dejected when trying to influence him/her to make them feel guilty, etc. 
(Negative Manipulation o f  Feelings)
_________ I would fully explain to them the reasons why I wanted the person(s) to
agree with my request. (Rationality)
 I would threaten to punish the person(s) if he/she/they did not go along
with my request. (Coercion)
I would appeal to the person(s) by referring to the nature of our
relationship and our sense of togetherness and mutual liking. (Referent Appeal) 
________ I probably wouldn’t do anything about persuading the person(s) in this
situation. I’d drop the matter and just hope that the person(s) would come around.
(Avoidance).
D iscrim inative F acility  87
Please use the following scale to Indicate the likelihood that you would use each
of the following strategies for the given situation.
Annoyances
P le a s e  im a g in e  th e  fo llo w in g  situ a tio n : You want to persu ade som eone from  engaging in an 
annoying habit.
E x a m p le :  Y o u r  n e ig h b o r  freq u en tly  h as fr ien d s o v e r  sm a ll p arties . U s u a lly , ab o u t 1 0 :3 0  or  1 1 :0 0  at 
n ig h t s o m e o n e  w ill  turn o n  the  s te r e o , and it w ill g e t  lo u d er  a s  the  g u e s ts  g e t  lo u d er . Y o u  w ant to  
p er su a d e  y o u r  n e ig h b o r  to  k eep  the n o ise  d o w n  w h en  it g e ts  late.
Strongly Strongly
agree disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Without going into details, I’d simply ask, ‘Can you do it?’ I wouldn’t
feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. {Direct 
Request)
_________ I’d put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to
persuade him/her. I’d get him/her in the right ‘frame of mind’ before asking. 
{Positive Manipulation o f  Feelings)
_________I would suggest that we talk over some compromise, and work
something out. {Compromise)
_________ I would show how disappointed I was in him/her. I’d act sad, hurt,
and/or dejected when trying to influence him/her to make them feel guilty, etc. 
{Negative Manipulation o f  Feelings)
_________ I would fully explain to them the reasons why I wanted the person(s) to
agree with my request. {Rationality)
_________ I would threaten to punish the person(s) if he/she/they did not go along
with my request. {Coercion)
I would appeal to the person(s) by referring to the nature of our
relationship and our sense of togetherness and mutual liking. {Referent Appeal) 
________ I probably wouldn’t do anything about persuading the person(s) in this
situation. I’d drop the matter and just hope that the person(s) would come around.
{Avoidance).
D iscr im inative  F acility  8
Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use
each of the following strategies for the given situation.
Assistance/Stranger
P le a se  im a g in e  th e  fo l lo w in g  s itu a tio n : You want a stranger to  do  a specia l fa v o r  fo r  you.
E x a m p le :  F o r  a s o c ia l  s c ie n c e  c la s s  that y o u  are tak in g , y o u  (a n d  y ou r g ro u p  m em b er s)  n e e d  to  
h a v e  a  grou p  o f  s tu d en ts  p a r tic ip a te  in  y o u r  ex p er im en t. T h e  p ro jec t c o u n ts  a s  a la rg e  p e rcen ta g e  
o f  y o u r  g ra d e . Y o u  w an t to  p e r su a d e  a g ro u p  o f  p e o p le  in  th e  c a fe te r ia  to  p a r tic ip a te  in  y ou r  
p ro ject.
Strongly Strongly
agree disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 Without going into details, I’d simply ask, ‘Can you do it?’ I wouldn’t
feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. (Direct 
Request)
_________I’d put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to
persuade him/her. I’d get him/her in the right ‘frame of mind’ before asking. 
(Positive Manipulation o f  Feelings)
________ I would suggest that we talk over some compromise, and work
something out. (Compromise)
_________ I would show how disappointed I was in him/her. I’d act sad, hurt,
and/or dejected when trying to influence him/her to make them feel guilty, etc. 
(Negative Manipulation o f  Feelings)
_________ I would fully explain to them the reasons why I wanted the person(s) to
agree with my request. (Rationality)
_________ I would threaten to punish the person(s) if he/she/they did not go along
with my request. (Coercion)
I would appeal to the person(s) by referring to the nature of our
relationship and our sense of togetherness and mutual liking. (Referent Appeal) 
 I probably wouldn’t do anything about persuading the person(s) in this
situation. I’d drop the matter and just hope that the person(s) would come around.
(Avoidance).
D iscr im inative  F acility  89
Please use the following scale to indicate the likelihood that you would use
each of the following strategies for the given situation.
Assistance/Permission-Parents
P le a s e  im a g in e  the  fo l lo w in g  situ a tio n : You want to gain perm ission fro m  you r paren ts  to  do  
som ething.
E x a m p le :  Y o u  w a n t to p ersu a d e  y o u r  p a ren ts to  se n d  (o r  lo a n ) y o u  m o re  m o n e y  fo r  c o l le g e .
Strongly Strongly
agree disagree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
W ithout going into details, I’d simply ask, ‘Can you do it?’ I wouldn’t
feel obliged to give any reasons or supporting arguments for my request. {Direct 
Request)
_________ I’d put on my happy face and act particularly nice when trying to
persuade him/her. I’d get him/her in the right ‘frame of mind’ before asking. 
{Positive Manipulation o f  Feelings)
_________I would suggest that we talk over some compromise, and work
something out. {Compromise)
_________ I would show how disappointed I was in him/her. I’d act sad, hurt,
and/or dejected when trying to influence him/her to make them feel guilty, etc. 
{Negative Manipulation o f  Feelings)
_________ I would fully explain to them the reasons why I wanted the person(s) to
agree with my request. {Rationality)
_________ I would threaten to punish the person(s) if he/she/they did not go along
with my request. {Coercion)
I would appeal to the person(s) by referring to the nature of our
relationship and our sense of togetherness and mutual liking. {Referent Appeal) 
________ I probably wouldn’t do anything about persuading the person(s) in this
situation. I’d drop the matter and Just hope that the person(s) would come around.
{Avoidance).
